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In the Shadow of the Neoliberal Reforms:
The Cycle of the Mobilization of the Unemployed in Argentina
Juan Carlos Torre
Abstract
For many years social studies classified the mobilization of the unemployed as a highly 
unlikely phenomenon; it was argued that the loss of jobs generates individual apathy, 
resignation and impotence. In the last twenty years, this conclusion has been the object 
of substantial revision. The reason is well known: the rebellion of the unemployed has 
become a reality in many countries, as it was the case in Argentina in recent years. 
This unexpected development had roots in the specific development of the country’s 
economy and society in the post-World War Two era. In the context of the neoliberal 
reforms in the 1990s, and their aftermath, the emergence of this movement had 
tremendous consequences for social equality, even today. This paper presents the 
specific factors which gave rise to this movement, its peak, and subsequent decline. 
Throughout, the focus is on the consequence for inequality among workers and in 
society.
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“The misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing 
compared to the misery of not being exploited at all.” 
Joan Robinson, Economic Philosophy (1962: 45).
1. Introduction
Why the unemployed do not rebel was the question W. W. Daniel posed in an article 
published in 1981 in the British journal New Society when he observed that the rise 
in the unemployment rate did not translate into a parallel increase in protest (Daniel 
1981). At the time, the acquiescence with which the loss of a job was received inspired 
a variety of explanations. These have included that the work ethic and the inclination 
to work have progressively declined; that redundancy payments and compensations 
have made the condition of joblessness more tolerable; and that the informal economy 
has progressively displaced the formal one, providing a refuge for the unemployed. In 
the author’s opinion, it was not necessary to delve so deep for an explanation. For a 
high number of those who lose their jobs unemployment is not a state or a condition, 
but a temporary parenthesis. Their efforts thus are focused on a single objective: 
getting back to work as soon as possible. As W. W. Daniel stated, in most cases, 
the experience of unemployment was not a long one; hence it was not accompanied 
by adverse reactions. However, at the end of his article, he acknowledged that the 
average lapse of time between jobs had started to grow. Therefore, he warned that if 
the present trends continued, very probably what had been just a brief interruption of 
the link with the labor market would turn into a more lasting condition for a substantial 
number of people, affecting the prevailing tolerant attitude toward the lack of a job 
(Daniel 1981).
W. W. Daniel’s article is a good testimony of a turning point. The tendency that the 
author noted in 1981 deepened in the subsequent years. In fact, since the crisis in the 
developed countries under the impact of the oil shocks at the end of the seventies, the 
dream of full employment gradually faded away. Furthermore, from the 1990s onwards, 
unemployment rates have increased incessantly. New economic difficulties have 
turned unemployment from a temporary into a structural problem, and large sectors of 
the population have become either permanently excluded from the labor market or at 
least for longer periods of time. In such a context, as Daniel thought, one would expect 
the unemployed to rebel.
However, it so happens that for many years, social studies classified the mobilization 
of the unemployed as a highly unlikely phenomenon. Material deprivation and social 
exclusion, it was argued, do not mechanically produce a drive toward collective action. 
The following are the three most frequently cited impediments. First, since job loss comes 
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together with a sharp and sudden fall in income, the unemployed tend to seek refuge 
in individual survival strategies rather than in collective action. Second, unemployment 
weakens the social networks within which they have built their daily life both inside and 
outside the workplace, thus confining them in a situation of social atomization hardly 
conducive to mobilization. Finally, the condition of unemployed is a publicly devalued 
status that deprives them of an identity that can be positively appropriated in order to 
legitimize their demands and break their political isolation. Under such circumstances, 
it was concluded, unemployment typically generates individual apathy, resignation and 
impotence (Maurer 2001).
In the last twenty years, this conclusion has been the object of substantial revision. 
The reason is well known: the rebellion of the unemployed has become a reality. 
Formerly considered improbable, the mobilization of the unemployed turned into a 
frequent phenomenon in different national contexts against the backdrop of industrial 
restructuring and austerity policies. Novel research, particularly in European sociology, 
has proposed new arguments to account for the fact that, against great odds, the 
unemployed have managed to organize, transforming their latent discontent into a 
powerful and sustained drive for collective action (Chabanet and Faniel 2012; Giugni 
2010).
Taking as a point of departure the perspective opened by new research, this paper looks 
at the mobilization of the unemployed in Argentina. Argentina is a good case to study in 
the light of this perspective because since the postwar period its labor market evolved 
following a pattern very similar to that of the developed countries. I refer to the typical 
features of what is known as the wage-earning society; that is, the incorporation of 
great sections of the urban workforce into the framework of labor rights, social security 
protection, and job stability. As occurs with all social phenomena, this landscape 
undoubtedly had exceptions. But, in general terms, it accurately portrays Argentine 
exceptionalism among the countries of Latin America which were characterized by the 
extension of the informal economy, the limits of the welfare policies and large areas of 
poverty.
This labor scenario was drastically altered by the neoliberal reforms implemented, 
in particular, in the 1990s. The unemployment rate, historically situated at 4% or 
5%, increased threefold; a vast universe of workers was confined to levels of social 
and material deprivation the country had never experienced before. To capture the 
effects of the neoliberal reforms on the world of work, many observers saw in them a 
latinamericanization of Argentine society. This is a plausible description. But it would 
be incomplete if it failed to mention the social and political process that gradually 
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gained momentum in the context of the great transformation of the 1990s: the vigorous 
mobilization of the unemployed that has no counterpart in other countries of the region. 
The purpose of this paper is to identify the conditions that made this process possible 
and explore its consequences. To this end, my main source will be the rich scholarly 
work it gave rise to. In the first three sections I will outline the historical background 
from which the unemployment problem emerged and turned into a public issue. In the 
fourth section, I will look at the pioneering episodes of unemployed mobilization that 
took place in the provinces 1996-1997, as a prologue to the fifth section that focuses 
on the area that will become the epicentre of social protest: Greater Buenos Aires. In 
the sixth and seventh section I will introduce some key concepts to understand the 
mobilization of the unemployed. The eighth section centers on the waves of protest 
that unfolded between 1998 and 2007. From sections nine to twelve I will explore 
changes in the political landscape, the economic situation and the policing of protest 
that lead to the decline of unemployed mobilization, covered in the thirteenth section. 
Finally, in an epilogue, I will refer to the consequences of this experience of the world 
of work on the trends of social inequality in Argentina today.
2. The Road Towards Neoliberal Reforms
The 1970s oil crises brought to an end The Glorious Thirty Years which, according to the 
expression coined by French economist Jean Fourastié, had framed the development 
of the advanced nations since the end of the Second World War. Together with the 
effects of these crises, the intellectual consensus built around Keynesianism, the 
Welfare State, and full employment also came to an end. A telling sign of the times was 
the Nobel Prize in Economics awarded to Friedrich Hayek in 1974 and Milton Friedman 
in 1979, both staunch critics of state intervention in the economy and enthusiastic 
advocates of market forces. The high priests of the new gospel launched a strong 
ideological offensive but only achieved real influence on economic policy in the 1980s 
during the administration of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain and Ronald Reagan in 
the United States. This policy turn, however, had been anticipated many years before 
in the Southern Cone of Latin America; first in Chile in 1973 and then in Argentina 
in1976.
On both sides of the Andes, an era of social and political mobilization had ended in 
military dictatorship. The regime presided over by General Pinochet took the lead and 
swiftly turned the Chilean economy into one of the least regulated and least statist in the 
West, and opened its borders to international commercial and capital markets. Initially, 
the monetarist recipe seemed incapable of curbing inflation, but by 1977 prices began 
to yield and soon after, the economy started growing again. The experiment set up 
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by the Chilean “Chicago Boys“ under the helm of Pinochet’s dictatorial powers would, 
however, end up in a deep crisis and a forced change of plans in 1982. But when the 
military junta took over power in Argentina, the prestige of the neoliberal program was 
still intact and eased the way to revamping the foundations of a conflictive society.
The Argentine military’s reformist script was aimed against the semi-autarkic 
development model within which Argentina had operated under the economic leadership 
of the State (Gerchunoff and Llach 1998). When the time came to make decisions, the 
reformist ambition was forced to yield to a more urgent priority: ending the economic 
chaos prompted by an annual inflation rate of 700%. The anti-inflationary strategy 
launched by the economic policy-makers had to abide with a political imperative set 
up by the military: for security reasons, employment should not be affected. Therefore, 
the adjustment policy essentially consisted in a strong reduction of real wages of 
approximately 30% compared to previous years, and a price truce negotiated with the 
business sector. This first attempt at curbing inflation was a blow for wage earners who 
were simultaneously affected by a ban on union activities. In the end, these measures 
proved mostly ineffective. This attempt would be followed by others which, dictated 
by changing approaches to the problem of inflation, would be equally unsuccessful: 
a monetary reform which opened the way to classic monetarism, a tariff reduction 
designed to curb internal prices by increasing imports, and finally a crawling-peg 
exchange rate regime intended to anchor inflationary expectations. The latter program 
led to intense speculation as the expected convergence between the exchange and 
inflation rates proved unattainable.
However, help arrived in time to aid the economic policymakers’ blind attempts to 
curb inflation. After the oil shocks of 1973 and 1978, the abundance of liquidity in the 
international financial system opened the gates to a massive influx of capital to Latin 
American countries as a choice destination. Argentina was a major beneficiary. The 
arrival of foreign capital gave the economic experiment a brief reprieve. The downside 
was an increase in foreign debt. This timely aid actually helped the government buy 
some time, but did not reduce uncertainty about the future of the economy, in particular 
because the military leadership became receptive to the newly critical voices from the 
business community. After five years of continuously frustrated economic experiments, 
the country experienced capital flight and the onset of a deeply-feared recession. 
Thereafter, old and new economic teams spent their efforts on rescue operations – 
from forcing state- owned firms to contract debt abroad, to nationalizing private sector 
debt in order to avoid a generalized bankruptcy of the business sector – while inflation 
and the fiscal deficit climbed back up to extraordinary heights. In this ominous context, 
macroeconomic discipline melted into thin air. In turn, the original reformist drive was 
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already waning under the effects of various factors: the military veto to the privatization 
of public firms, the economy’s troubles caused by a trade opening that ended up in 
massive imports and the destruction of industrial sectors and, ultimately, due to the 
almost always clandestine response of the losers of adjustment policies, who resorted 
to defensive tactics they had learnt throughout years of chronic economic instability. 
The 1982 Malvinas/Falklands War dealt the final blow to a dictatorship that left the 
economy in tatters and an impoverished society alongside the tragic legacy of political 
repression.
The return to democracy in 1983 faced the new civil administration with a double 
bind: the weight of foreign debt and renewed conflict over distribution. The efforts 
of the Alfonsín administration were gradually consumed by the challenges of such a 
demanding scenario, to which the deteriorating terms of trade soon added even more 
somber tones. Against this background, the attempts to bring inflationary pressures 
under control followed one another, and were neutralized time and again by the war 
of attrition among all economic actors seeking to win back lost ground in the battle 
for income distribution – a war of attrition all the more destabilizing because of the 
presence of a new actor, the foreign creditors.
The hyperinflation that would put an end to the first democratic transition government 
turned out to be more powerful than the military’s sword: the experience of economic 
chaos caused any social resistance to crumble and cleared the way for a process of 
sweeping neoliberal reforms (Sigal and Kessler 1997). In the shadow of hyperinflation a 
chapter of Argentina’s history was closed and another one opened. Thus, the country’s 
exceptional status within the Latin American context would gradually come to an end in 
the 1990s. According to Maristella Svampa, this exception consisted of a society that, 
beyond its regional heterogeneity and despite the strength of its economic elite, had 
distinguished itself throughout history by its ability to incorporate successive waves 
of population into employment, education, and welfare, offering opportunities for 
individual and collective advancement (Svampa 2005). Certainly, this process of social 
inclusion was not effective for everyone nor did it work the whole time. Nevertheless, 
the outcome of the experience was a rise in social expectations sustained by the 
memory of several decades in which new generations were indeed better off than their 
predecessors, or at least could aspire to be so. The gap between expectations and 
achievements widened more than once in the course of the country’s turbulent history. 
Nevertheless, time and again the mobilizing myth of equal opportunity reactivated the 
quest for increased access to resources and rights. The great transformation brought 
about by neoliberal reforms and its main consequence – the de-incorporation of vast 
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sectors of the working-class – altered the social structure that had hitherto distinguished 
Argentina from its neighbors in the region.
The reform process that changed that societal model forever was marked by a true irony 
of history: it was promoted by the political movement that had contributed decisively to 
its inception in the postwar years: Peronism (Gerchunoff and Torre 1996). The closer 
one looks at the process of pro-market reforms, the more the consequences of this 
peculiar political development come to light. As already pointed out, the heightened 
social tolerance to economic adjustment induced by the experience of hyperinflation 
facilitated the new economic course. However, in this critical juncture, the Peronist 
government led by president Menem sought and found the necessary room to 
implement the reforms in a way that would provide them with less contingent political 
support. With this purpose in mind, the government paid attention to the groups and 
economic sectors that could be negatively affected by the reforms and whose hostile 
reaction entailed a risk to the sustainability of the reform program: the big national 
conglomerates which had grown under the auspices of trade protection and state 
subsidies, the larger unions, and the clientelistic political machines of the governing 
party itself.
A complex negotiation process thus took shape: the losses imposed by economic 
reforms on these strategic actors in certain areas were compensated by concessions 
in other areas. The outcome was a partial deregulation of markets, exceptions to the 
generalized trade opening, the sale of state-owned firms to selected buyers, and 
the selective reduction of public employment. In the realm of labor relations, greater 
flexibility was introduced for individual labor contracts but unions managed to preserve 
the centralized framework for collective bargaining, and their control over the financial 
resources of union-run health services. As Sebastian Etchemendy has pointed out, 
reforms could follow the neoliberal script and move forward in some areas because they 
were left incomplete in others (Etchemendy 2001, 2011). The cleavages introduced by 
market reforms thus tended to create divisions within, rather than between, groups 
and sectors. This dynamic exerted a strong pressure towards the segmentation of the 
socio-economic structure of Argentine society.
The control of inflation through the introduction of a currency board – the rigidity of which 
sought to compensate past stabilization failures – was in turn critical for leveraging 
the deployment of market reforms and their effects. The favorable international 
context, with foreign capital flows during the 1990s, also contributed to the outcome. 
In a more stable framework, the economy resumed growth. At first it did so strongly, 
subsequently less so, until the stubborn adherence to the formula that had made it 
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possible to overcome hyperinflation complicated the adaptation to the changes in the 
global economic climate. An acute recession ensued and, under the new government 
of President Fernando de la Rua, the currency board collapsed in 2001. Throughout the 
nineties the social landscape of the country as we knew it became unrecognizable. If 
the process of globalization marked by neoliberal reforms was associated in Argentina 
with the image of a social scene in ruins, it was because there was a lot to destroy: the 
material foundations and institutions of the more inclusive society that had emerged 
throughout the years following spells of prosperity and under the state initiative.
3. Transformations in the World of Labor
To put the impact of the neoliberal reforms on the world of labor into perspective, I will now 
underscore some defining characteristics of the labor market. Historically,  Argentina 
contrasted with the typical setting of many Latin American countries characterized by 
strong demographic pressures and excessive labor supply. Argentina’s singularity was 
the outcome of a slower pace of growth of the economically active population which, in 
turn, was the effect of relatively low demographic growth, produced by an early transition 
to low levels of birth and mortality rates. With two thirds of the population residing in 
urban areas, the pool of rural labor force was limited by the absence of masses of poor 
peasants present in other Latin American countries. These factors explain the fact that 
the country regularly received an additional supply of labor provided by migrant waves 
from neighboring countries, in particular since the 1950s.
With a slow-growing active population as well as comparatively lower underemployment 
and unemployment rates, for many years the Argentine labor market exhibited a more 
balanced dynamics that tended to favor the demands of wage earners. An important 
contribution to this pattern was the incorporation of vast contingents of the urban labor 
force into labor right guarantees, social security protection, and stable employment 
(Torre 2004). Despite the frequent ups and downs of the country’s political trajectory, 
these labor market institutions stood out for being more inclusive. Although informal 
labor did exist, its size was not large enough to alter this general picture. Finally, to 
complete Argentina’s profile, a critically important aspect must be emphasized: income 
distribution was much more equitable in a region where strong social inequality had 
been traditionally the norm.
In the mid-1970s, three indicators summed up the main features of the world of labor. 
First, the low incidence of poverty: only 5% of urban homes had per capita incomes below 
the poverty line. Second, a situation of quasi-full employment: the open unemployment 
rate affected a mere 3.4% of the labor force. Finally, inequality as measured by the Gini 
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coefficient – a relatively low rate of 0.34 – differentiated Argentina from all other Latin 
American countries (Cruces and Gasparini 2009).
The first cracks in this working-class landscape were the consequence of the economic 
adjustment policies of the last military dictatorship. In 1984 the state’s statistics agency 
published a study, “La Pobreza en la Argentina“ (Poverty in Argentina), based on 
the 1980 national census. The study revealed the considerable increase of poverty: 
22.3% of homes were then below the poverty line, highly concentrated in urban areas. 
The results of this study amounted to a veritable culture shock to the self-image of a 
country in which poverty was considered to be a residual phenomenon, limited to small 
sections of the population (Grondona 2014). The effects of the drastic reduction in real 
wages placed the problem of hunger at the center of the public agenda.
In 1984, the new democratic administration launched an emergency program 
consisting of the periodic distribution of food boxes to families in situations of extreme 
social vulnerability. The beneficiaries of food aid amounted to 5,600,000 people. 
The projected duration of the program was two years, in the belief that the problem 
was temporary and would become irrelevant as the country resumed the path of 
growth following proactive economic policies. The still relatively low unemployment 
rates, around 6% throughout the 1980s, lent support to this belief. But despite brief 
and increasingly sporadic successes, inflationary pressures proved hard to check 
and induced successive renewals of the food aid program to compensate for the 
deterioration of the lowest strata of society’s income. The 1989 hyperinflationary crisis 
predictably increased the share of homes under the poverty line, which reached 44%, 
and simultaneously widened its scope by adding a new group called the “new poor“, 
who came from the most vulnerable layers of the middle class (Kessler and Di Virgilio 
2003), to the vast population of “structural poor“ who had always been on the edge of 
indigence. From this moment on, food programs would become a permanent feature 
of public social policy.
The market reforms in the 1990s opened new fissures in the labor market. For much of 
the decade, a novel phenomenon in the country’s history took place: economic growth 
combined with job losses. The unemployment rate, which by 1991 was 6.9%, began 
its ascent to 10% in 1993, reached 18.6% in 1995 – due to a brief external shock – and 
then scaled back to 14.5% in 1998. Since then, with the economy now in recession, 
the unemployment rate moved steadily upwards until it reached 21% in 2001, on the 
eve of the collapse of the macroeconomic stability regime set up in 1991 (Beccaria and 
Maurizio 2012). The main engines powering the rise in unemployment rates were the 
liberalization of trade and the privatization of state-owned firms. The former entailed 
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the destruction of jobs associated both with the disappearance of firms that could not 
adjust to a more competitive environment and to the reduction of the labor force by 
firms that incorporated new technology or changes in the organization of the production 
process. Likewise, the transfer of big state- owned firms –the telephone, electricity, 
gas, water, airline, oil, chemical and steel companies– to private capital opened up a 
massive wave of layoffs. The size of the labor force in the former state firms, bloated 
for political reasons, was drastically cut down: an estimated 195,000 workers lost their 
jobs between 1989 and 1995. In the same period, the other engine of unemployment 
was the many rationalization plans of the national public bureaucracy, which reduced 
its labor force by 118,000 jobs in the same period. Last but not least, I must mention the 
impact of unemployment on the mass of workers with fragile ties to the labor market: 
those whose source of subsistence was precarious jobs within the wide universe of the 
informal economy.
The advocates of market reforms initially believed that economic restructuring could 
be accomplished without a sustained deterioration of employment levels. The speedy 
recovery of economic activity as from 1991 induced them to foresee the possibility 
of absorbing the labor supply growth. But the leap of the unemployment rate to two-
digit figures since 1993 dealt a blow to those expectations and shed light on a central 
flaw in the ongoing restructuring process: the absence of active policies oriented to 
maximizing the chances of pulling people back into the labor market.
To illustrate these consequences I will briefly examine a selected case of privatization 
policy: the sale of the state-owned steel firm, Sociedad Mixta Siderúrgica Argentina 
(SOMISA), to a strong national private group in 1991 (Beccaria and Quintar 1995). 
As part of the purchase, 6,200 workers, about 50% of the firm’s staff, were fired and 
received generous monetary compensation. The new owners of SOMISA introduced 
changes to its production strategy which led to the closure or downsizing of many 
firms and shops that had provided it with supplies and services. After two years, 
the combined effect of the personnel rationalization at the firm and the layoffs in 
its network of contractors generated an increase of 16.2% in unemployment in the 
industrial area where SOMISA was located. But there is additional data that renders 
a clear picture of the loss of human resources and welfare brought about by the way 
the privatization process was implemented. By then the majority of workers with jobs 
were either self-employed or owners or employees of very small establishments. This 
occupational structure owed a lot to the fact that those who lost their jobs invested their 
compensation money in setting up small businesses: cigar and candy stores, lottery 
agencies, clothing stores, taxicab companies, appliance stores, etc. Most of these 
investments would, in the end, be short lived because, against what these improvised 
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entrepreneurs expected, local economic activity did not grow. A similar frustration was 
experienced by those who allocated their compensation money to home improvements 
in the belief that unemployment would be temporary and they would relatively soon get 
back their old jobs. Very few would be so lucky: in an industrial area characterized by 
high levels of formal employment, the only job offers to increase would be those for 
informal positions with no social security benefits.
Returning to the big picture of the labor market in the years of neoliberal reforms 
two traits indicated the epochal change: the reduction in the ability to generate jobs 
and the deterioration in the quality of employment. I have already noted the increase 
in unemployment rates. I should now add that the job losses in manufacture were 
staggering: by 2001 industrial employment had dropped 41% compared to 1991. In 
the construction sector employment fell by 22%. The exception was the commerce 
sector, where the level of employment showed steady growth, but evidence indicates 
that the quality of jobs offered was poor. The second characteristic of the period was, 
indeed, the increase in precarious and self-employed work swelling an informal sector 
which was already considerably large. Many of those expelled from the formal sector 
as well as family members looking for work to compensate for the job loss of the 
household head found refuge here. In 1991 the percentage of the active population in 
the informal sector was 50.2%; by 1996 it had risen to 52.2%, and reached 54.2% in 
2001 (Beccaria and Lopez 1997).
New legislation contributed to widen the ranks of this labor universe where the 
instability of labor career-paths was the norm. The new rules incorporated a trial period 
to labor contracts, subject to cancellation after three months without warning, which 
subsequently promoted a high turnover in firm personnel. Thus, these were years in 
which it was not only hard to find a job, but also in which those who found one tended 
to stay in it for less time. Although these mutations in the labor market affected all 
wage earners, the lower strata of the population were the ones who bore the brunt 
of the fall in employment levels and the deterioration in the quality of employment. 
Their employment problems neutralized what they had gained from the increased 
price stability of their main budgetary item (foodstuffs) caused by the success of the 
anti- inflationary policy launched in 1991. In this context, it is hardly surprising that 
poverty levels, after dropping to 21.6% from the peak registered during the 1989 
hyperinflation, grew back to 32.6% in 2001 and, to crown a decade of market reforms, 
the Gini coefficient rose to 0.52, abruptly taking Argentina’s society back to a distant 
and forgotten past (Cruces and Gasparini 2009).
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4. The Unemployed at Bay
In this section I deal with the policy responses to the impact of neoliberal reforms on 
the labor market, the dominant reaction of the main unions, and the isolation of the 
unemployed from both trade union activity and the public agenda.
The main objective behind the political logic with which the Menem administration 
approached economic liberalization was, according to Sebastián Etchemendy (2011), 
to neutralize the potential resistance of strategic actors from the previous economic 
order by resorting to selective compensation mechanisms. In the labor arena, these 
sectors were the major trade unions which had grown under the protection of legislation 
that guaranteed them monopolistic representation of workers, centralized collective 
bargaining and the control over union-run health services financed by compulsory 
payroll contributions from employers and workers.
To review the types of compensation allocated to unions, I begin with a few selected 
cases of privatization policy. As indicated above, the sale of major state-owned firms to 
private capital was accompanied by layoffs and early retirement of personnel. Those 
who retained their jobs received 10% of the shares of the new private companies. The 
management of employee share ownership programs was assigned to the unions. 
Additionally, many unions participated in the purchase of state-owned assets, as was 
the case with the oil trade union that bought part of the state oil firm Yacimientos 
Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), and the light and power union who bought from 20% to 
40% of the shares of various thermal energy plants. Certainly, this type of compensation 
was confined to the unions operating in former state-owned firms. But another large-
scale privatization initiative offered new business opportunities to the majority of the 
biggest unions. In 1994, the social security system was reformed by adding an individual 
capitalization tier, managed by private pension funds, to the existing public one; the 
new regulatory framework also authorized the unions to set up their own pension funds 
(Alonso 2000).
An important consequence of the political exchange between the government and the 
unions must be highlighted: the refusal of the national union leadership to support the 
rather limited and sporadic protests against the waves of layoffs caused by market 
reforms. Between 1991 and 1993 attempts at rebellion promoted by the local union 
sections exploded in the more affected sectors – steel, telephone, oil and railways – 
but mostly ended in resounding failure, abandoned by their national union leaders and 
beaten down by President Menem’s heavy-handed policy.
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Two factors facilitated the political exchange between government and unions. The 
first was the influence of political loyalty. Its incidence became manifest by the sudden 
demise of the union leadership that had successfully launched 13 general strikes 
against adjustment policies during the previous Alfonsín presidency. When Menem 
set market reforms into motion, they made a call to resistance, only to discover its 
audience was limited. Soon afterwards, most of the main trade unions rallied under the 
banner of collaboration with the Peronist government. In fact, the majority of the union 
leadership reacted with the same spirit of understanding that predominated among the 
socialist trade unionists in Spain when the leader of their party in government, Felipe 
Gonzalez, turned to economic liberalization in the early 1980s (Beroud 2012).
The second factor that eased the political exchange between government and 
unions was the persuasive power of neoliberal ideology. It gained its strength from 
the convincing linkage promoted by the economic establishment and international 
financial institutions between the 1989 hyperinflationary crisis and the termination of 
the state-led inward development cycle. Due to the disrepute that past protectionist and 
statist positions had fallen into, the reforms promoted by the fashionable Washington 
Consensus won the cultural battle when the time came to determine the way out of the 
emergency. The slogan “There Is No Alternative“ that Margaret Thatcher popularized 
in Great Britain penetrated vast sectors of public opinion as well as the ranks of 
the governing party. While it is true that the compensation policies implemented by 
president Menem introduced corrections in the road to economic liberalization, these 
did not alter the new course. Facing a structural adjustment that was regarded as 
necessary and inevitable, the major unions pragmatically opted not to challenge the 
Peronist government in order to take advantage of the opportunities that the dynamics 
of political exchange offered to protect their corporate interest.
Oscillating between open cooperation and tactical retreat, the national union leadership 
organized in the CGT provided President Menem with a key ingredient to manage 
the reform process: the labor truce. Argentina during the 1990s thus showed that 
unions could not only mobilize but also de-mobilize, and that in the absence of their 
cooperation, the travails of economic transformation were potentially more hazardous 
and conflictive. The few pockets of workers resistance tended to be concentrated in 
unions of public employees, teachers, and the lower strata of the public bureaucracy. 
Resorting to strikes and walkouts, they demanded better wages and working conditions 
with uneven success and in time joined forces to constitute a minor dissident labor 
confederation, the Central de Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA) that later on played a 
role in mobilization of the unemployed.
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The labor truce set the context for negotiations between the government and the 
unions on the priorities of the neoliberal agenda regarding labor matters (Etchemendy 
and Palermo 1998). On one hand, there was the reform of labor relations in order to 
make contracts more flexible, decentralize collective bargaining, reduce payroll taxes 
and cut back compensation for layoffs; on the other hand, the de-regulation of union 
health services to open up the market of workers’ health coverage to private firms. Both 
matters were negotiated on the grounds of reciprocal concessions. This was the case 
with the first round of labor reforms in 1991: the unions backed the introduction of time 
limits for new labor contracts and the government bailed out heavily-indebted union-
run health services. The fluidity of this political exchange was notably interrupted when 
the economic source of trade union power, the union-run health services, was at stake. 
In 1992, when the deregulation bill became public, the union leadership put to rest 
its disputes over tactics and closed ranks, launching the only general strike that took 
place under the Menem presidency. In the face of union pressure, the government set 
aside its original idea: the reform that was eventually implemented limited competition 
to the existing universe of union-run health services by allowing workers to choose 
among them, regardless of the branch in which they were employed – a mechanism 
that ended up benefiting the most powerful unions which later on, in no small measure, 
became business partners with private health firms.
In the course of negotiations, the use of extreme measures such as a general strike 
was not an exclusive resource of union leaders; to achieve its aims, the government 
also resorted to the unilateral tool of presidential decrees. Using this tool, it limited 
the right to strike in public services, conditioned wage increases to improvements 
in productivity, and introduced deep cuts in employer contributions to social security 
in order to reduce labor costs. The most ambitious legislative initiatives were also 
unilaterally drafted by government officials. When the time came to make decisions, 
however, this procedure proved ineffective. The reform bills were blocked in Congress 
due to the labor confederation lobbying the government party’s parliamentary group. To 
end the impasse, the government resumed its bargaining strategy in 1994: it summoned 
the CGT and the UIA (the business association) to jointly discuss and design the bills 
before sending them to Congress. This corporatist exercise was fruitful; predictably, the 
bills bore the marks of the logic of political exchange. The new legislative framework 
incorporated more flexible labor contracts, both in terms of their duration (shortened 
in time) and of the termination costs (reducing severance payments), and of working 
conditions (hours, vacation days and their distribution throughout the year, workforce 
mobility, etc.). Through the pressure of the CGT, these reforms were circumscribed to 
small and medium enterprises, and left out major firms. Collective bargaining was also 
decentralized to SMEs, but the legal capacity to negotiate remained in the hands of the 
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national union leadership which could delegate it to local sections, closing the door to 
the emergence of firm-level autonomous unions.
One last chapter remains to be mentioned to complete this brief account of labor reform 
in Argentina in the 1990s: In 1998, in the final stages of President Menem’s term in 
office, a new law reversed many of the flexibility norms that had been passed in 1991 
and 1994. But before characterizing this step back in the neoliberal agenda as proof 
of the political influence that the unions managed to wield, the event must be placed 
in a wider context. There is considerable evidence showing that the limits the union 
leaders were able to set to the legislative offensive in favor of labor flexibility were 
not sustained. In reality, under the pressure of uncertainty over employment, workers 
were forced to adapt to the de facto flexibility imposed by management. The obstacles 
put up by union leaders to stop the reforms that affected their organizations proved 
to be more effective: they preserved the legal monopoly of union representation, the 
primacy of centralized collective bargaining, their control over health services, and 
even accessed new business opportunities with the purchase of state assets and the 
financial administration of shares from privatized firms and pension funds. In exchange, 
union leaders tolerated the implementation of a structural adjustment that led to the 
decline of the wage-earning society and with it to the social de-incorporation of wide 
sectors of the world of labor.
Indeed, the situation of the unemployed was not on the radar of the main union 
organizations. In the words of Maria Victoria Murillo, their energies were invested in 
a strategy of organizational survival aimed at extracting resources for their leaders 
and advantages for their members from the political exchange with the government 
(Murillo 2005). In comparative terms, the Argentine unions were not alone in their lack 
of action in favor of the unemployed. The existing literature points out that the relation 
between unions and the unemployed tends to be ambivalent (Faniel 2012). Unions 
are potentially more available to mobilize against layoffs or bankruptcies in which their 
own bases are affected than to back an anonymous mass of unemployed workers 
who are frequently perceived as a debilitating factor for the situation of employed 
workers. Furthermore, massive job losses usually translate into weakened ties with 
organized labor and create a gap that conspires against introducing the problem of 
the unemployed in the union agenda. This gap may widen when the unions take part, 
as social partners, in bargaining over the impact of reform policies. What happened in 
Argentina also occurred to the Spanish labor confederations during the Felipe Gonzalez 
administration. Without necessarily sharing the same policies, union leaders in Spain 
also gave priority to the protection and compensation of the most stable core of wage 
earners, and abstained from launching initiatives in favor of those workers increasingly 
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excluded from the labor market (Beroud 2012). The cause of the latter was taken up 
by local support networks in the areas most afflicted by unemployment, this was also 
the case – as we shall see later – in the Argentine experience.
The situation of the unemployed was also absent from the government’s agenda as it 
embarked on the road toward neoliberal reforms. This absence made a special case 
of Argentina in the Latin American context. Indeed, it was common for the promoters of 
structural adjustment to set up safety nets to alleviate the transition costs for the most 
vulnerable social sectors (Graham 1994). Two initiatives, different though they were, 
can be noted in this respect. In Chile, the Pinochet dictatorship launched the Minimum 
Employment Program in 1975, a year after putting economic liberalization into motion. 
Its aim was to carry out infrastructure works at the local level – cleaning up streets and 
parks, painting public buildings, and other menial jobs – by hiring unemployed people 
for part-time jobs with a meager monetary payment. In Mexico, President Salinas 
de Gortari created the National Solidarity Program PRONASOL at the same time he 
promoted the deepening of fiscal orthodoxy and market reforms. The PRONASOL was 
simultaneously aimed at curbing poverty levels and offering job opportunities, thus 
channeling investments to the most vulnerable urban and rural areas via food, health, 
public works programs.
In light of these experiences, the performance of Menem’s government left a lot to 
be desired both in terms of the timing and scope of its employment policies. It must 
be acknowledged, however, that the labor reform passed early on in 1991 included 
the National Employment Fund. It was intended as an unemployment insurance 
scheme that would replace a similar program that was actually ineffective because 
the hitherto high value of layoff packages operated as a functional equivalent. 
Two factors played against the impact of this initiative. First, the selection criteria 
tended to favor wage-earners in the formal sector and explicitly excluded informal, 
temporary, domestic and construction workers – the segments of the labor market 
more vulnerable to unemployment. The profile of the unemployed population was 
eloquent in this respect: three out of every four used to have informal jobs; that is, 
no social security protection. After four years of implementation the unemployment 
scheme only covered 5% of all the unemployed in 1996. The second factor was that its 
financial architecture - significantly dependent upon employers’ contributions to social 
security - made it vulnerable to changes in economic policymaking. That was the case 
when shortly after the introduction of the National Employment Fund, in order to cut 
labor costs, the government decided to sharply reduce employers’ contributions. Thus, 
benefits diminished precisely at the moment workers were flowing into the lines of the 
unemployed (Golbert 1998; Bertranou and Paz 2007).
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Direct job-creation policies to ease the plight of the unemployed were adopted only 
after six years of structural adjustment. In 1996, the Trabajar Program was launched, 
financed in part by loans from multilateral financial institutions and following a design 
similar to that of the Minimum Employment Program in Chile: the participation of 
unemployed workers in temporary employment programs managed by municipalities 
for infrastructure improvement works in exchange for small monetary compensation. 
The comparison between the Chilean and Argentinean programs illustrates the limits 
of the belated initiative of the Menem administration. Both programs were similar in 
design, but their coverage could not have been more contrasting: while in Chile the 
PEM covered up to 34.6% of unemployed workers, the PT in Argentina only covered 
13.4% of the unemployed population including the beneficiaries of the unemployment 
insurance scheme (Schipani 2006; Golbert 1998). In short, one conclusion must be 
drawn: left to their own devices by the unions and with limited protection from the state, 
the workers expelled from the labor market were held at bay. For many of them the only 
resource at their disposal would be the clientelistic networks of the Justicialista party, a 
strategy of social protection to which we will return later in this article.
5. The Unemployed on the Move
In this account of government policies and union stances vis-a-vis the unemployed, we 
have now arrived at a turning point: the beginning of the mobilization of the unemployed 
circa 1996-1997 that broke the relative ease with which structural adjustment was 
being implemented. In order to reconstruct those mobilizations and their further 
developments, I will rely on the work of Maristella Svampa and Sebastian Pereyra, the 
first systematic sociological study of the collective action of the unemployed (Svampa 
and Pereyra 2003).
The pioneering episodes in the mobilization of the unemployed took place in Cutral-Co 
and Plaza Huincul, in the southern province of Neuquen, and in Tartagal and General 
Mosconi, in the northern province of Salta. Economic activity and community life in 
these small towns was organized around the dominant presence of YPF, the state oil 
company, which used to be the country’s largest firm. With higher-than-average wages, 
urban improvement works, two-week paid holidays in Buenos Aires and other summer 
resorts, hospitals, housing and sports clubs for their staff, YPF had turned these oil 
enclaves into hubs of strong demographic growth. The privatization of the firm in 1992 
changed all that causing huge layoffs. Just like in other privatized companies, the 
unemployed received generous severance payments. The smaller group of workers 
who kept their jobs obtained shares from the new private firm. The national leadership 
of the oil workers union managed to obtain additional compensation: the creation of 
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small venture firms staffed by former YPF workers that would provide services for the 
newly privatized company. As occurred in other privatization cases, this initiative was 
not followed up by policies to aid these brand new entrepreneurs in coping with their 
new challenges. Four years later, highly indebted and unfit for competition, most of 
them went bankrupt. However, although their individual survival strategies also failed, 
the experience of these former YPF workers contrasted with that of the former SOMISA 
workers mentioned above.
The former state steel company was located within an industrial cluster. The proximity 
of alternative sources of employment offered an expectation of future reinsertion into 
the labor market to all those who were forced to close down their kiosks, sell their 
taxis, and lay to rest their dreams of self-employment. The scene that faced the former 
YPF workers was initially more somber because the restructuring of the firm after its 
privatization resulted in a quick contraction of economic activity in those oil enclaves. 
However, it was soon clear that economic depression would eventually play to their 
benefit. By affecting most social sectors in these towns, economic depression built 
bridges between the plight of the unemployed and the grievances of shopkeepers, 
small entrepreneurs, public employees, teachers, and local politicians, sowing the 
seeds of a large-scale revolt.
The social dynamics of these oil enclaves just outlined enabled the unemployed to 
overcome the traditional obstacles hindering their collective action. The ecology of 
these towns, structured by dense social networks just like in company towns where 
the workplace and the residence overlap, neutralized the risk of social atomization and 
made it possible for individual deprivation to be perceived as collective dispossession. 
In turn, the multi-sector nature of grievances provided the adequate framework for the 
unemployed to avoid political isolation. Finally, the context of economic depression 
closed the door on the search for individual solutions and cleared the way for resorting 
to collective protest.
In Cutral-Co and Plaza Huincul the trigger for mobilization was the provincial governor’s 
decision in June 1996 to suspend the bid for building a fertilizer plant. The response 
was cohesive and forceful to the likely prospect of the loss of investments that could 
rekindle economic activity and diminish the threat that those small cities could become 
ghost towns. Summoned from the local radio station, citizens marched onto the national 
highway and cut off traffic, demanding to be heard by the governor. The mobilization, 
which at its peak brought out 20,000 people, was maintained for seven days, alongside 
various roadblocks which served as rallying points for the different actors involved, and 
managed to attract the attention of the national media because of its dramatic scale. 
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Faced with the size of the protest, repressive measures were put on hold, and after 
feverish negotiations with the governor at the site of the protest, terms were agreed 
upon to lift the roadblocks: a deferral of debt payments for shopkeepers and small 
business, and the distribution of social aid among the poor and the unemployed. In the 
short term, only the former was effectively implemented. In view of the delay in receiving 
the promised aid, the unemployed and youth groups from poor neighborhoods brought 
back the roadblocks ten months later, riding the wave of teachers’ protests against 
wage reductions. This mobilization, on a somewhat smaller scale, faced repression 
which provoked one death and left several people injured. The news about the clashes 
with the police triggered an immediate popular reaction: about 10,000 people took to the 
highway, forced the security forces to retreat, and reopened negotiations with provincial 
authorities. Apart from bringing a solution to the teachers’ protests, negotiations ended 
with a decision that would have momentous consequences on the future development 
of the mobilization of the unemployed: the distribution of 1,500 Trabajar subsidies.
The May 1997 mobilization in the oil enclave of Tartagal/General Mosconi in the 
province of Salta showed several features in common with the experience of Cutral-
Co/Plaza Huincul. First, what spurred the protest was also an issue with strong impact 
on the area’s social and economic life: the rise of public utilities and the frequent 
interruptions in the electricity service by the local electricity company. Beyond its 
immediate consequences, the issue channeled the discontent over the end of the 
social and economic system that had supported the existence of these oil enclaves 
for many long years. Second, and predictably, the mobilization also revealed a multi-
sector nature that enabled the former YPF workers and their families from poor 
neighborhoods to join a united front with journalists, political leaders and businessmen. 
Third, the tactic to which the mobilized resorted was also the roadblock. For seven 
days, with logistical support from the population – who provided food and clothing – 
they kept a permanent guard and successfully cut off traffic. The massive mobilization 
halted the repression and secured ample coverage from the national media. It should 
be noted that roadblocks were divided into two clearly-distinguished poles that were 
distant from each other: one organized by the notable figures in the community and 
the other grouping the unemployed. In the negotiations with provincial authorities, the 
latter adopted the more intransigent positions; for several hours the conflict seemed to 
worsen, until the intervention of the local bishop enabled an agreement.
The terms of the agreements followed a set script. A deferral of payments for debt 
contracted with public banking institutions, loans for business, funds for school 
dining halls, and a wide range of compensations for the unemployed: 3,000 Trabajar 
subsidies for one year, another 1,000 for six months, unemployment subsidies for 
      desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series No. 98 | 19
1,000 people for one year, and 1,400 permanent jobs in private oil firms. Still, there 
was one significant difference with the experience of Cutral-Co/Plaza Huincul. While 
the mobilization of the unemployed there left no organizational legacy, in Tartagal/
General Mosconi an association was formed, the Union of Unemployed Workers (UTD) 
which brought together the worker identity and union tradition of former YPF workers, 
and the belligerent energy of the youth from poor neighborhoods with little formal labor 
experience. In the following years, the UTD would play a crucial role in triggering new 
protests in the northern provinces.
The successful denouement of the mobilization of the early risers, to borrow an 
expression from Sidney Tarrow (1994), generated a formidable demonstration effect on 
jobless workers by revealing the vulnerability of the authorities to protests and signaling 
the time was ripe for engaging in the contentious demand for workfare benefits. The 
consequences of the mobilization were particularly noteworthy in the urban periphery 
of Buenos Aires, an area with a high concentration of unemployed in the population. 
In the words of one of its leaders, “In 1997 we had our organization but did not know 
what to do with it. Then the events of Cutral-Co took place. So we went up to the 
mayor of the municipality and said to him: ‘You give us Trabajar subsidies or we will 
block the road’. To avoid a roadblock they gave us what we asked for” (Garay 2007). 
Thus, under the auspices of these events began an intense wave of conflict that held 
the country’s political life on tenterhooks for years. With it a rapid process of diffusion, 
imitation, and adaptation of the pioneering experiences of the oil enclaves to Greater 
Buenos Aires took place turning it into the epicenter of the piquetero movement. Due 
to its singularities, the urban periphery of the country´s capital posed new challenges 
to the mobilization of the unemployed.
6. Marginality and Poverty in Greater Buenos Aires: Clientistic  
 Networks and their First Challengers 
Greater Buenos Aires is the vast urban periphery that surrounds the capital of Argentina, 
and is home to one third of its inhabitants. Its 24 districts are not a homogeneous space 
in social and urban terms. For the purpose of this study, the most significant cleavage 
is the difference between the Northern zone and the Western and Southern zones. 
The Northern zone was the site of an early process of suburbanization of high and 
middle class sectors. The Western and Southern zones, on the other hand, were the 
result of different developments. Their expansion began in the 1930s and 1940s when 
the effects of the 1929 World Depression on agricultural export-led growth gave a new 
impulse to industrialization based on the internal market. The new factories that settled 
in the outskirts of the capital acted like magnets on the waves of internal migrants that 
flocked to the city from the crisis-ridden agricultural areas. During these years, the 
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socioeconomic contours of Greater Buenos Aires were drawn: large firms and a myriad 
of workshops and small businesses around which dense suburban networks emerged, 
characterized by the vigorous and predominant presence of the working class.
Changes in the productive structure and new demographic movements gradually 
redefined the social landscape of the urban periphery. In the 1960s, the manufacturing 
sector began to produce new goods with capital-intensive techniques, consequently 
lowering its capacity to create employment (Gerchunoff and Llach 1998). However, 
Greater Buenos Aires remained the preferred destination for people looking for work.
Following in the footsteps of the rural population escaping agricultural crisis in the 
1930s, it was next the turn of migrant workers from the northern provinces ravaged by 
the sugar industry crisis. In turn, they were joined by the growing influx of immigrants 
from neighboring countries, particularly Bolivia and Paraguay. Predictably, these new 
job-seekers would not find employment in the industrial sector. Out of the 730,000 
jobs created in the Greater Buenos Aires between 1960 and 1970, almost half were 
found in the service sector: 25% in retail, 20% in construction, and only 7% in industry 
(Llach 2011). As these new cohorts joined the labor market, their presence resulted in 
a proliferation of low quality jobs. They would only find relatively stable employment in 
low-skilled and highly informal jobs such as construction works and domestic services.
While the labor market still exhibited low unemployment rates, the urban periphery, 
on the other hand, displayed less welcoming features. The districts closer to the 
capital, inhabited by internal migrants from the first phase of industrialization that had 
benefited from housing, transport and public services policies, were already saturated. 
Therefore, the newcomers had to settle in more distant areas and in highly precarious 
conditions due to the lack of drinking water and sewage systems, and the slow and 
deficient provision of gas and electricity. It was in this last and inhospitable frontier of 
the Greater Buenos Aires where early mobilizations demanding housing and shelter 
for the constant influx of new settlers would emerge (Merklen 2005). A frequently-
used strategy to push forward their demands was to occupy vacant land, generally 
owned by the state. These initiatives, which would multiply in the more permissive 
context of the transition to democracy in 1983, often received support from external 
actors such as priests from nearby churches and human rights organizations. Ranging 
from the logistical support for the mobilizations to the resolution of legal conflicts, 
their contributions made a difference for the popular sectors demands. And they 
were also instrumental for framing the illegal occupations as reactions to a flagrant, 
visible injustice: the lack of access to the right to a decent urban habitat, historically 
acknowledged by the State, and the benefits of which were already enjoyed by workers 
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who had settled earlier around the city’s perimeter. This state of affairs, brought to the 
fore, in the words of Silvia Sigal, a “situation of marginality” (Sigal 1981:158); that is, a 
situation characterized by the lack of correspondence between the societal definition 
of recognized rights and the effective enjoyment of those rights.
The demand for basic conditions of the urban habitat – a plot on which to build a 
house, the infrastructure of public services – had an important political consequence: 
the emergence of the neighborhood as an arena of solidarity and common objectives 
for popular sectors otherwise divided by different forms of insertion in the labor market. 
While the search for employment tended to rely on individual strategies, the demand 
for urban public goods promoted cooperation and the formation of networks centered 
on the place of residence. As the seminal work of Denis Merklen on land invasions in 
Greater Buenos Aires showed, local communities played a crucial role in mobilization 
during the 1980s (Merklen 2005). When successful, these mobilizations strengthened 
the local communities because they stimulated the creation of neighbor associations. 
The purpose of these associations was two-fold: on one hand, they bargained with the 
authorities for property rights over the occupied land and, on the other, they demanded 
the provision of basic public services, schools, health centers for the new settlements.
In the course of time, the associations born from the claims for a decent urban habitat 
would not be the only expression of the politicization of the popular sectors. With the 
reactivation of party competition, Greater Buenos Aires witnessed the deployment 
of the powerful Peronist party machine, the Partido Justicialista (PJ) (Ollier 2010). 
Comfortably installed in a setting where its electoral predominance was uncontested 
and financed by the resources of public patronage, this political machine came to rest 
on a vast web of neighborhood organizations, sports clubs, cooperative associations, 
and school kitchens. This organizational fabric reflected the mutations taking place 
within the party’s grassroots since the 1980s. The gradual shrinkage of the formal labor 
market reduced the relative importance of unionized workers and expanded the weight 
of the more heterogeneous universe of the popular sectors. In this context, the PJ was 
transformed, as underscored by the excellent study of Steven Levitsky, from a party 
grounded in the unions to a party based on clientelistic networks (Levitsky 2003).
Keeping the municipalities of the Greater Buenos Aires and the patronage resources 
at their disposal under their iron-fisted political control, the local party bosses put into 
motion a variety of social assistance initiatives to cater to the basic needs of the lower-
income strata. Neighborhood brokers (locally known as punteros) were awarded a 
key role in the implementation of social assistance policies (Zarazaga 2014). Men and 
women were dedicated full-time to political activities and firmly rooted in their territories, 
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the brokers operated as links between the people and the authorities. As such, they 
exerted influence on choosing who would benefit from the distribution of food, clothing, 
and medicine, in exchange for their support in the factional disputes of the PJ. In a 
social landscape marked by acute, pressing needs, the informal party organs also 
operated as problem-solving networks (Auyero 2001), becoming involved in obtaining 
collective goods such as electricity, roads, subsidies for school kitchens and sports 
clubs, and general aid for families in distress due to illness or death of relatives, or 
eviction threats. The provision of particularistic benefits and collective goods paved 
the way for the capillary penetration of the patronage-based party and forged strong 
reciprocity ties between brokers and their clients.
These political practices did not change significantly when President Menem, in a 
radical departure from traditional Peronist policies, launched his pro-market reform 
program. This issue has deserved special attention in Levitsky’s study. In his field work 
during the nineties, Levitsky polled militants from several popular neighborhoods and 
discovered that a significant number of them were unhappy with the government’s 
neoliberal turn. In light of this evidence, a question arose: Why did such dissidence not 
result in active opposition? The answer Levitsky offered stressed the importance of two 
factors. The first was access to state patronage. Though grounded in political loyalty 
and personal ties, the workings of the party at the local level relied on public resources. 
These were vital for fueling the clientelistic networks as much as for providing militants 
with jobs in the state. This double dependency conditioned the reaction to Menem’s 
policies. Leaving the party, particularly in the urban periphery where Peronism was 
culturally and electorally hegemonic, meant giving up decisive resources and walking 
out into the cold.
However, leaving the party was not necessarily on the menu of options for dissidents. 
The second factor that explains why dissidence did not turn into active opposition 
was the autonomy enjoyed by the local branches in the PJ organizational structure. 
Contrary to what happens in centralized mass parties, in which subunits must adhere 
to the national committee’s directives or run the risk of being expelled, Levitsky 
showed that the decentralized structure of the PJ prevented militants from having to 
choose between seconding Menem’s policies or facing political ostracism. During the 
1990s, the PJ operated as a wide umbrella that allowed the local leaders to continue 
practicing their own version of Peronism which had little to do with the official agenda. 
With masses in the memory of Evita, homages to the historic date of October 17th 
and Perón, and the permanent invocation of social justice and nationalism, they kept 
the Peronist political subculture alive. As already mentioned, in Greater Buenos Aires 
there were also more small and marginal community organizations led by activists 
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from human rights and popular Catholic associations that focused on social work and 
maintained less clientelistic linkages with their grassroots.
This political landscape experienced a significant mutation in the aftermath of the 
mobilizations in the oil enclaves in the provinces of Neuquen and Salta.  As underscored 
by one of the leaders of the future piquetero movement in the Greater Buenos Aires 
in the quote cited above, the success of these mobilizations was an important source 
of inspiration and provided the neighborhood-based organizations with new aims and 
methods. Born in many cases out of land-occupation initiatives, these organizations 
were initially rooted in the La Matanza district of western Greater Buenos Aires. With 
1.3 million inhabitants, this area had one of the highest shares of poor population 
in the urban periphery (Manzano 2013). The first initiatives of these neighborhood 
organizations had aimed at increasing the access to government food programs. To 
achieve this objective, they set up soup kitchens in public squares, led demonstrations 
to the City Hall, and occupied public buildings. Therefore, at the time the events of 
Cutral-Có/Plaza Huincul and Tartagal/General Mosconi gained notoriety, in La Matanza 
there was already a core of activists trained in territorial mobilization and in possession 
of two valuable assets: the de facto recognition they had obtained from the authorities 
and the substantial amounts of food they had distributed independently of the networks 
run by Peronist brokers. Their next step would be getting the unemployed to claim the 
benefits of the workfare programs.
7. The Role of Activists in the Organization of the Unemployed
In an earlier section I have referred to the demobilizing effects that the experience of 
unemployment produces upon individuals. Well documented in the classic studies on 
the impact of unemployment, these effects were confirmed in the research developed 
in Argentina by sociologist Gabriel Kessler: job loss not only generates economic costs 
to individuals. The sudden impossibility of providing for their family produces a severe 
loss of self-esteem while simultaneously generating a deep skepticism about the 
possibility of changing their fate by way of collective action (Kessler 1996). The misery 
of unemployed, states Della Porta, does more to deter protest than to facilitate it by 
creating feelings of shame and hopelessness among the affected individuals (Della 
Porta 2010). From the many available testimonies, I quote one from an activist in La 
Matanza:
We started to meet up with other fellows from the neighborhood that had lost 
their jobs. Many were in that inward-oriented mood, and ashamed of having to 
admit they had lost their job and their electricity was being cut off because they 
couldn’t afford to pay the bill (Interview published in Schipani 2006: 87).
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Given the prevailing mood among the unemployed, their propensity to see their 
situation as a personal failure and therefore to fall into a state of passivity and 
impotence, activists in the urban periphery did not encounter a pre-existing disposition 
to protest. To promote this disposition was the taxing task they had to engage in, as 
was highlighted by Andres Schipani’s study on the mobilization of the unemployed in 
Argentina (Schipani 2008). By focusing on the role of hard-core activists, Schipani 
relied on the approach that emphasized the key role played by external agents in the 
organization of unemployed (Richards 2002). For this approach, the unemployed are 
a relatively powerless and deprived sector of society. In the language of the social 
movements literature, they have few resources to mobilize, and therefore to engage in 
collective action they must overcome severe obstacles. The outcome of this struggle 
is generally uncertain and fragile. This is why most of the time, the unemployed 
are mobilized instead of mobilizing themselves. The availability of external agents, 
whether political activists, union militants, or members of NGOs, thus constitutes a 
key requirement for the political articulation of unemployed discontent since it provides 
them with the necessary organizational skills, technical assistance, and leadership.
In this case, however, the use of the concept of external agents requires some 
clarification. Taken literally, this concept may evoke the image of activists landing 
on economically-depressed areas with the aim to exploit an existing potential for 
mobilization. As will be shown below, this is not what happened in the early stages of 
unemployed collective action in the Greater Buenos Aires. The activists who promoted 
in the first initiatives in demand of workfare benefits in La Matanza had solid roots in 
the local terrain. These roots notwithstanding, they can be viewed as external agents 
due to another aspect of their credentials: their close links to political networks that 
transcended the local communities where they intervened. This is the sketch that 
emerges from the two main cores of activists, Federación Tierra y Vivienda (FTV) and 
Corriente Clasista Combativa (CCC) (Manzano 2013).
The origins of FTV go back to the early 1980s when a group of young Catholics and 
priests influenced by liberation theology began to roam the neighborhoods preaching 
the reading of the Bible. Religious preaching gave way to social work and thus to the 
formation of self-help associations of poor families. The intervention of these activists, 
who took charge of the needs of sectors to which they didn’t belong but towards 
whom they leaned out of a sense of solidarity, was subsequently the focal point for 
new recruits: militants from local sections of teachers and public employee unions. 
With time, groups of neighbors joined their social work, and their contribution led to 
the creation of a network of neighborhoods that towards the 1990s gathered local 
associations, school kitchens, and cooperative associations. The cradle of the FTV 
was the cooperative association El Tambo, formed on the basis of a successful land 
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occupation in 1986 led by Luis D’Elía. A teacher coming from popular Catholicism, after 
some activism in the Christian Democratic Party, D’Elia joined the center-left group 
Frente Grande, born in 1993 as a splinter from Menem’s Peronism, and was elected 
councilman for the La Matanza municipality. In 1998, he joined the CTA, the workers 
confederation opposed to the official CGT. Attuned to the times, the CTA had launched 
the slogan “The Neighborhood is the New Factory”, and promoted the formation of the 
FTV as its territorial branch and entrusted its leadership to the rising Luis D’Elía.
The La Matanza CCC was created by extreme left-wing militants residing in the district. 
The biography of who would become its best-known spokesman, Juan Carlos Alderete, 
sums up the typical profile of this group of activists. Born in the northern province of 
Salta, Alderete moved to Buenos Aires in the 1960s, found work in a dairy products 
factory, and soon became a union delegate enrolled in the most militant groups of the 
times. During the military dictatorship, he was imprisoned twice and lived a clandestine 
life. With the return to democracy he resumed union activism as a worker in a textile 
factory and joined the Revolutionary Communist Party (PCR), a small Maoist left-wing 
organization. In the mid-1980s he settled in La Matanza and led a land occupation. 
Along with other union activists from his party, in 1987 he established the La Emilia 
neighborhood association, through which the property rights to the land and the 
basic utility infrastructure for the neighborhood was eventually obtained. La Emilia 
became a PCR stronghold in the urban periphery to which professionals affiliated with 
the party (physicians, teachers, lawyers, psychologists, social workers) went to offer 
their services. In 1995 Alderete lost his job and joined the ranks of the unemployed. 
Since then, he has refocused his activism from union workers to the unemployed. 
Coordinating with his comrades from the northern provinces, who had redirected their 
efforts to the same terrain and built the CCC in Jujuy, in 1997 Alderete organized the 
La Matanza CCC, the main branch of the PCR among the unemployed.
The individual trajectories of the main leaders of the FTV and the CCC are a fine 
illustration of the attributes of the activists who took charge of the problem of 
unemployment in the Greater Buenos Aires. They were mostly professional, full time 
militants, experienced in managing conflict and negotiating with the authorities. To these 
personal skills they added their links to support networks from which they obtained 
technical assistance, material resources, and media contacts. One last attribute must 
be mentioned to complete their profile: the motivation behind their political practice 
was to achieve aims beyond the cause of the unemployed, such as the creation of a 
pole of social resistance or the transformation of the existing social and political order. 
Their commitment to these long-term objectives acted as a shield against the personal 
sacrifice inherent to activism in unfavorable contexts and against powerful adversaries.
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On the basis of their still-embryonic organizations, these activists embarked on a 
new enterprise: politicizing the issue of unemployment. To move forward, they had to 
deal with several obstacles posed by the social and political landscape of the urban 
periphery. As cited above, existing studies underline the strong presence of clientelistic 
social networks. In the midst of the gradual decay of welfare levels, the Peronist political 
machine was able to exert a certain degree of social control over the urban poor that 
neutralized the formation of independent neighborhood associations. The calls to 
action by activists therefore had to be made in neighborhoods that hitherto channeled 
their demands through Peronist brokers. This obstacle proved less insurmountable 
in some districts than others. Specifically, in those where organizations could count 
on support networks external to the local communities and on the persistent action of 
politically committed militants. Thanks to these resources, the organizations that would 
eventually constitute the FTV and the CCC in La Matanza managed to survive the 
tactics of cooptation and intimidation and to break through the traditional clientelistic 
networks. It must be noted, though, that similar experiences took place, albeit on a 
smaller scale, in other districts. One of them was the formation of the Unemployed 
Workers Movement (MTD) in southern Greater Buenos Aires, after the Hunger March 
of September 1996 in which 2000 people paraded through the main square of the 
country’s capital, the Plaza de Mayo.
Another challenge the activists met in trying to get a foothold in such hostile terrain was 
the heterogeneity of the unemployed population. The likelihood that a group will engage 
in contentious action is higher when it is located in a context that facilitates the sharing 
of experiences. In such a setting, the members of the group not only put forward the 
same demands but also do so in the same place, at the same time and against the 
same people. This was typically the background to the pioneer mobilizations in the oil 
enclaves. The close social bonds inherent to company towns and the visibility of the 
effects of the privatization of YPF created a favorable context for collective action by 
inducing the emergence of a sense of identity and a principle of opposition among the 
workers who had lost their jobs. Unlike what happened in the oil enclaves, job losses in 
the urban periphery occurred in a different moment and under different conditions. The 
universe of the unemployed encompassed recent and long-term unemployed workers; 
youth seeking in vain for their first job; former industrial workers, and a high share 
of informal workers. This variety of experiences conspired against the emergence of 
common attitudes and made it more difficult for the different sections of the unemployed 
to identify those politically responsible for their exclusion from the labor market.
It was in this hard, complex environment that activists had to carry out their task of 
creating a climate of agitation and protest against unemployment. Two developments 
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came to their aid: the impact of the successful mobilizations in the oil enclaves and the 
political dynamics of workfare programs.
8.  Political Sources of the Mobilization of the Unemployed
As I indicated earlier, the political window opened by the pioneer episodes in the 
provinces of Neuquen and Salta had a positive effect on the mobilization of the 
unemployed in Greater Buenos Aires. There were three more productive legacies: (1) 
the emergence of a new identity among the unemployed; (2) the popularization of a 
new mode of collective action; (3) the definition of a common policy goal. These three 
legacies lent inspiration and vigor to the wave of protest that, in subsequent years, 
would lead the unemployed from the margins to the center of the political stage.
For a brief characterization, let us begin with the first, the new identity. Daniel Mouchard 
(Mouchard 2010) has pointed out that an excluded sectors’ first act of rebellion concerns 
their identity. More specifically, it consists of the passage from a negatively valued “us”, 
an expression of wants and a source for stigmatization, to an empowered “us”, a carrier 
of a demand for justice and dignity. This act of rebellion usually manifests itself through 
a discursive operation. The sectors in question seek to replace the name for which 
they are conventionally known by a novel one that designates the birth of a collective 
identity that is also new. Piqueteros was the name the unemployed mobilized in Cutral-
Có/Plaza Huincul and Tartagal/General Mosconi called themselves. It referred to the 
roadblock to which they resorted to give visibility to their grievances and to demand 
solutions.
In the tradition of the working-class struggle, the picket was a barricade set up by 
workers in conflict at the entrance of plants in order to block the way for strike-breakers. 
By extension, the roadblock, with cohesive groups occupying the highways and piling 
up burning tires to cut off traffic, recreated that format of disruptive action and gave 
its promoters a platform to build a new collective identity. Forged in the experience 
of mobilization, the name of piqueteros played a de-stigmatizing role: it provided the 
basis for a positive identity to all those who had been confined to the socially devalued 
status of unemployed. A new source of dignity, the capacity for struggle and resistance, 
as pointed out by Maristella Svampa, filled the empty space of the dignity of work 
(Svampa 2005).
As a modality of claim-making activity, roadblocks were not an innovation; groups in 
rural areas had used it in the past. The novelty, rather, was the fact that it was used 
to force the authorities to act on the problem of unemployment. In fact, the recourse 
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to roadblocks could be seen as a sort of collective bargaining by riot. This expression 
was coined by Eric Hobsbawm in his study of the Luddite movement England in the 
early nineteenth century (Hobsbawm 2013). In the absence of better tools in these 
early stages of working-class struggle, the destruction of machines was, according 
to Hobsbawm, a weapon to put pressure on factory owners in order to extract 
concessions on wages and working conditions. From the perspective offered by this 
historical reference, the picket reveals another important dimension. As we just pointed 
out, it was certainly a means through which the unemployed built a new collective 
identity and secured their visibility. But they resorted to the picket first and foremost 
because they expected to get something in return: to establish a bargaining arena 
with the authorities for the allocation of social aid. Without other means of pressure 
available, the unemployed made the picket their main instrument to enter the political 
fray: the lifting of the roadblocks became their bargaining chip to obtain unemployment 
subsidies.
Finally, the creation of workfare programs since 1996 had a catalytic role in the 
mobilization of the unemployed by providing a common policy goal. The existence of 
a solution, or at least the promise of one, was a powerful incentive that transformed 
what was until then diffuse discontent over the lack of jobs into a strong stimulus for 
collective action.
Let us now focus on the second process under consideration, the political dynamics 
of workfare programs. In what follows I shall explore its effects on the mobilization of 
unemployed. I start with a proposition drawn from the literature on unemployment and 
protest. It states that a high level of unemployment is not necessarily translated into 
protest by the victims of this situation. Rather than the level of unemployment, it is the 
frustration of the expectations created by the awareness of the existence of a solution 
that spurs the feeling of deprivation and with them the willingness to protest. The 
demands of the unemployed increase in view of the rights they have at their disposal, 
generating stronger and more sustained protests when the enjoyment of those rights 
is diminished or limited (Chabanet and Faniel 2012). That is why the context most 
conducive to the mobilization of the unemployed is one that combines a certain level of 
social protection coupled with restrictions on its benefits. This was indeed the scenario 
produced by the design and implementation of the Plan Trabajar created in 1996.
The launching of the workfare programs had a crucial initial impact on a symbolic 
level: it removed the lack of work from the sphere of individual responsibility of those 
who had lost their jobs and framed it as a public issue that should be addressed by 
public policies. In other words, it implied official recognition of the legitimacy of the 
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unemployed grievances and turned them into potential creditors of social benefits 
from the government. However, the way in which Plan Trabajar was designed and 
implemented did not facilitate the transition of a great number of unemployed to 
the condition of effective holders of social protection. As will be remembered, the 
distribution of workfare benefits was assigned to the municipalities. From the beginning, 
the universe of potential beneficiaries remained higher than the number of subsidies 
available. This fact, in addition to the absence of clear criteria for their allocation, had a 
predictable consequence: it supplied Peronist local bosses with resources they could 
manipulate in a discretionary manner to maintain their clientelistic networks.
The lack of transparency in the distribution of workfare benefits generated growing 
discontent among all those unable to access them. Stressing what they have in 
common despite their differences – deprivation of social protection as a consequence 
of clientelistic practices – activists were able to instill among the unemployed a sense 
of injustice, precisely a requisite for mobilization. In addition, the example of Cutral-
Co gave activists more arguments to encourage the unemployed to make demands 
and to drive them into action. First, it showed that through struggle, injustice might be 
redressed. Second, the adoption of the name of “piqueteros” provided the unemployed 
with an identity in conflict with those who were concretely responsible for their 
marginalization. The activists managed to create among their followers a sense of 
injustice, a feeling of agency and a belligerent identity; in sum, the three components 
of what Doug MacAdam has called “the process of cognitive liberation” that makes 
possible the transformation of acquiescence into resistance (Mac Adam 1982: 34-35)
Considering the general state of demoralization among the unemployed and the 
dissuasive presence of the party patronage machines, it is not surprising that the practical 
effects of the process of cognitive liberation were limited at the onset. Nevertheless, 
they were sufficient enough to enable the activists and their organizations to gather 
an initial critical mass capable of taking action and thus opening an alternative access 
channel to workfare benefits. This situation made consecutive protest more likely as 
the activities of this avant-garde gave the unemployed a feeling of empowerment and 
set in motion a self-reinforcing process of political protest (Olivier, Marwell and Teixeira 
1985)
9. The Waves of Protest
The protest by the unemployed in the Greater Buenos Aires unfolded over almost a 
decade throughout four waves.
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9.1 First Wave
The first wave covered the 1997-1998 period. As indicated above, it began in July 
1997 with the successful challenge against the clientelistic distribution of workfare 
programs in La Matanza by La Emilia Neighborhood Association, led by Juan Carlos 
Alderete. It organized a demonstration in San Justo, the district capital, disrupting 
traffic and occupying the main square in demand for subsidies from the Barrios 
Program that the provincial government had launched following the model of the Plan 
Trabajar. The mobilization replicated another one carried out a year earlier in which 
protesters successfully obtained food aid from the municipal authorities. This time, 
after several days of protest, they were promised seventy workfare subsidies but 
the promise was only partially fulfilled because the local PJ bosses distributed the 
subsidies discretionally. In this context, the Neighborhood Committee, capitalizing on 
the experience of La Matanza activists, resorted to the same methods that El Tambo 
Cooperative Association had used shortly before that: it carried out a community census 
in order to build its own list of potential beneficiaries. Nevertheless, the committee also 
had to resort to more direct action measures, such as the occupation of City Hall, to 
enforce the promise of the seventy subsidies. The denouement of this first episode 
encouraged the agitation and propaganda efforts of the activists: it showed that real 
chances existed of getting results through collective action. Fairly soon. the unemployed 
in other nearby neighborhoods flocked to the La Emilia Neighborhood Association in 
search of support, thereby preparing the ground for the formation of La Matanza CCC 
in 1998. That year and after six months of struggle, the CCC managed to secure 100 
new benefits for each of the neighborhoods that constituted the organization. Activists 
within Luis D’Elía’s area of influence built up similar experiences which, as previously 
mentioned, paved the way to the creation of the FTV as a territorial branch of the CTA.
A closer look on the political logic of the mobilization promoted by the unemployed 
organizations brings an important matter to light. Although these organizations 
demanded unemployment subsidies in the name of the need of the unemployed, 
when the time came to decide who the beneficiaries would be, the selection criterion 
centered not on the condition of poverty but on the degree of personal involvement in 
mobilization. This criterion served as an effective mechanism to overcome the classic 
collective action problem: the free-riders, individuals who aspire to enjoy the benefits 
of a collective good without participating in the efforts to obtain it. The consequences 
of this kind of behavior are predictable: if all the unemployed could indiscriminately 
access the fruits of the picket they would have no reason to participate in it, depriving 
the organizations of their pressure power to provide the collective good. Thus the 
distribution of workfare programs by the organizations was conditioned to the merits 
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accrued by the unemployed through their participation in the struggle. The picket, 
therefore, did not only open up an alternative channel to clientelistic networks for 
access to workfare programs; it also offered the unemployed organizations selective 
incentives to guarantee and strengthen their mobilization capacity (Franceschelli and 
Ronconi 2002).
The criterion for the distribution of benefits was applied using a registry of participation 
in each and every demonstration. The organization’s activists in the neighborhoods 
went through the picket lines and demonstrations checking attendance. The order of 
merit among the unemployed was then established on the basis of their participation 
in collective action: the more they participated, the higher their chances of obtaining a 
subsidy. The arguments of a CCC leader go to the heart of the matter:
We have been much criticized for the issue of giving scores for participating in 
the protest. But we understand that a neighborhood in great need that mobilizes 
100 demonstrators cannot get the same as another neighborhood with the same 
needs that only mobilizes 10 demonstrators. That’s why we tell the people: you 
are only going to get something as long as you can organize yourselves and 
mobilize. He who wants fish must get wet (Manzano 2013: 149).
The scoring system admittedly had some exceptions: only a few absences with justifiable 
causes were tolerated; cases of extreme need also received special treatment. But as 
a rule, the participation in a protest was the only way to get one of the unemployment 
subsidies the organizations negotiated with the authorities. In Greater Buenos Aires, an 
area permeated by the culture of clientelism, the link between unemployment subsidies 
and commitment to the struggle played an important pedagogic role: it helped to modify 
the self-perception of the unemployed by making it possible for them to stop viewing 
themselves as recipients of the favors granted by political brokers and start crediting 
their own effort for the improvements in their living conditions.
The mobilization of the unemployed in the urban periphery, subsequently extended to 
the urban centers in the provinces, led the authorities to multiply the number of national 
and provincial workfare programs in an attempt to defuse social tensions. The monthly 
average number of beneficiaries of the Plan Trabajar escalated from 62,000 in 1996 to 
126,000 in 1997. There was a slight decrease in the two following years: from 116,000 
in 1998 to 105,000 in 1999 (Golbert 2004). It should also be noted that there was a 
parallel decrease in the level of protests. This decline would only constitute a brief lull 
in the cycle of the unemployed mobilization.
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9.2 Second Wave
 
The second wave of protest took place in 2000-2001. This was a period of strong 
growth of the piquetero movement. To account for it, allow me to take one step back 
and focus again on the profile of the activists in the Greater Buenos Aires area. Although 
their activism was centered in the neighborhoods and revolved around the question of 
unemployment, their organizations were neither mere neighborhood associations nor 
unions for the unemployed. As noted before, the main motivation of these entrepreneurs 
of mobilization was to be able to weigh in the national political arena in pursuit of 
their long-term objectives. With this aim in mind, as they managed to take root in 
their territories, they oriented most of their efforts to networking throughout the several 
focal points of protest that emerged in the urban periphery. This task was facilitated 
by the high level of mutual acquaintance between the leaders of the unemployed 
organization. As noted in Andres Schipani’s research, in the past a significant number 
of these leaders had forged strong ties through shared experiences in the political and 
union arenas. These ties were crucial for coordinating joint action. A first exercise in 
such coordination took place in La Matanza in mid-1998 when the FTV and the CCC 
decided to close ranks with a view to organizing future mobilizations. With this larger 
organizational platform, they were in better position to take advantage of the political 
opportunities that would be opened up by the inauguration of President De la Rua in 
December 1999.
Elected by a non-Peronist coalition – between the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) and 
Frente País Solidario (Frepaso) – and confronting a difficult economic situation, De la 
Rua began his tenure launching an adjustment program featuring strong public spending 
cuts. The reduction in the number of beneficiaries of the Plan Trabajar initiated by the 
previous administration was intensified: they were scaled back to 50,000. After several 
months of low activity, the piquetero movement responded by increasing the frequency 
and duration of roadblocks. To give greater scope and visibility to their plight, the FTV 
and the CCC launched in June 2000 a bold initiative: the blockage of the National 
Route 3, a central highway that traverses the La Matanza district and links the national 
capital with the south of the province. The roadblock lasted six days and was only 
lifted when the national authorities agreed to restore unemployment subsidies to the 
district and to deliver significant amounts of food aid. Five months later, due to the lack 
of implementation of the June agreements, a second roadblock of Route 3 occurred. 
This time, the La Matanza groups were joined by other organizations from southern 
areas in Greater Buenos Aires. This organizational cooperation led to an upward scale 
shift by clearing the way for a mobilization that could move contention beyond the local 
communities in which each group had been operating.
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A brief description of this mobilization episode allows us to gaze at the two faces of 
the picket line. This is certainly an instrument for collective pressure. But it is also an 
arena in which a sense of community is forged and strengthened. Collective action, 
Donna Della Porta tells us, allows the unemployed to escape from the misery and 
hopelessness of daily life and share with others an active experience of solidarity 
(Della Porta 2010). According to the press reports, 3,000 people participated in the six-
day roadblock. Entire families camped out in tents made of sticks and plastic tarpaulins 
at the side of the road. Women, children, and elderly people guarded the tents during 
the days and were relieved by the men at night. The division of labor was a first-order 
priority for the organizers. Activists were in charge of distributing the food provided 
by the associations’ soup kitchens; others had to maintain security by controlling the 
entrances and exits from the picket line; there were also medics and nurses on call 
in case health issues arose. A platform was set up in a central spot that served as a 
meeting point for the assembly that was summoned every day to inform about the 
ongoing negotiations with the authorities and to discuss the measures to be adopted. 
Priests from neighboring parishes held a daily mass while in the evenings there were 
shows with musicians and invited artists. An activist summed up the experience in an 
interview: “It is a big self-help group and at the same time it’s like a big home for all” 
(CELS 2001).
The context of political opportunities in which the roadblock took place in November 
2000 played out in favor of its organizers by making available the support of influential 
allies. The first were the local bosses of the Peronist machine. The drastic reduction 
in the number of the Trabajar Program beneficiaries entailed a severe blow to the 
survival of their clientelistic networks. Faced with the emergency, they decided to 
show support for the piquetero movement and offered their services as mediators with 
the national authorities. With some exceptions, the majority of the activists reacted 
positively towards those who had hitherto been their adversaries and were now joining 
in a marriage of convenience in the common struggle for unemployment allowances. 
The roadblock was also extensively reported by the media. Television screens thus 
gave public opinion a window on the landscape of misery and hardship in the urban 
periphery, giving the problem of unemployment even greater national visibility.
The government, however, postponed the initiation of negotiations. It was then that 
new influential allies entered the scene. The CTA and a number of important unions 
led by the truck drivers’ union threatened to call for a general strike if the demands of 
the unemployed organizations were not swiftly met. The threat proved to be effective 
because the government appointed a presidential delegate who travelled to La 
Matanza to discuss the terms of an agreement. The negotiations with FTV and CCC 
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leaders and municipal officials ended with the offer of an ample set of benefits: more 
food aid, funds to repair school infrastructure and deliver medicines, and a significant 
increase in the number of unemployment subsidies. The magnitude of the concessions 
contributed to framing the protest as a successful strategy. Once activists perceived 
that the struggle paid off, they embarked on an intense door to door canvassing, 
touring the neighborhoods, encouraging new protests in order to obtain more benefits. 
The contagion effect enabled unemployed people with weaker organizations, such 
as those from southern areas in Greater Buenos Aires that had lost workfare benefits 
under the pressure of Peronist brokers, to access new subsidies and restart their road 
to growth.
The expansion of the piquetero movement was also due to the new format for workfare 
programs introduced by the De la Rua administration. This new format was aimed at 
limiting the resources that nourished the PJ’s political machine in the urban periphery 
and reducing the discretional nature of the distribution of benefits. After centralizing the 
management of the Trabajar Program in a state agency, the government established 
that not only the municipalities – as was until then the case – but also NGOs who 
submitted workfare programs at the local level could become recipients of benefits. 
Simultaneously, it was established that the workfare conditionality to which beneficiaries 
committed could be fulfilled both in the municipalities and through the community action 
of NGOs. The effects of the new format soon became clear: the existing unemployed 
organizations quickly turned into NGOs and several others promoted by new far left 
groups also claimed and obtained their status as such.
Candelaria Garay has underscored that the redesign of workfare programs empowered 
the unemployed organizations in several ways (Garay 2007). It increased their 
membership transforming the distribution of benefits in their hands into a selective 
incentive to recruit more associates. It provided the organizations with additional 
resources to finance their activities through small sums collected from workfare 
beneficiaries. Finally, the possibility of managing their own workfare schemes allowed 
them to consolidate the internal cohesion of their organizations through the participation 
of their members in several activities, such as bakeries, soup kitchens, small sewing 
businesses, and vegetable gardens. The unforeseen effect of the government’s 
strategy aimed at weakening the clientelistic machine of the PJ bosses was therefore 
the strengthening of the piquetero movement.
This second wave of protests was marked by new roadblocks motivated by the partial, 
if not total, lack of implementation of the agreements between the authorities and the 
unemployed organizations. The most important occurred in May 2001, again in La 
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Matanza. The blockade of Route 3 lasted sixteen days and ended in a double success: 
the concession of even more workfare subsidies and social aid measures, as well as 
the ratification of FTV and CCC as authorized voices of the unemployed.
Indeed, the government’s linkage to the mobilization of the unemployed was not limited 
to the policies adopted in response to their demands; it also encompassed the reactions 
to their recourse to disruptive action. As highlighted by Della Porta and Reiter, this is 
a crucial dimension in the interaction between the state and the protest movements 
(Della Porta and Reiter 1998). In this respect it is fair to say that the De la Rua 
administration made an effort to avoid coercive interventions against the protesters. In 
an area as politically sensitive as the Greater Buenos Aires – the popular stronghold of 
the Peronist opposition – law enforcement was considered less important than peace 
keeping. The protest was handled with tolerance, and the government abstained from 
the use of force. Still, it brought lawsuits against the promoters of the roadblocks. In 
this context, a debate on the right to protest divided both the courts and public opinion 
(Gargarella 2005). Some condemned the picket for blocking the free flow of traffic and 
regarded it as a crime punished by the Penal Code. In contrast, others considered the 
picket as a manifestation of the constitutional right to petition before the authorities. 
While the former prioritizes their concern for those who suffered the disruptive effects 
of the roadblocks, the latter argued it was the duty of the courts to uphold the right to 
free expression of groups who had no access to conventional means of petition to 
advance their demands. While this debate ensued in the courts, the press reported 
in June 2001 that opinion polls showed that most of the people rejected the use of 
repressive policies to manage the unemployed protest.
The resort to repression sidestepped by the national authorities was, however, the 
standard response among the provincial governments. The most notorious case 
occurred in Northern Argentina, in the province of Salta. In June of 2001 a prolonged 
roadblock in the town of General Mosconi gave rise to harsh confrontations between 
protesters and security forces that led to two deaths and the arrest of many activists. 
The impact of the use of force was immediate and widespread. The entire community 
of the former oil enclave closed ranks around the mobilization and, in the rest of the 
country, various piquetero organizations went out into the streets to repudiate the 
repression, and ask for the release of those arrested. As would be clear in the future, 
the use of coercion tended to escalate the level of the protest instead of acting as a 
dissuasive mechanism. In a democratic context, the resort to repressive violence by 
the state becomes an additional source of claims and demands, and wakens powerful 
feelings of indignation and solidarity that strengthen collective action. On this occasion, 
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the De la Rua administration intervened again sending a high government official to 
reopen negotiations and defuse the conflict.
This second wave of protests culminated in the launching of an ambitious initiative: the 
merging of the already vast collection of unemployed organizations. Galvanized by the 
success of their recent struggles, the FTV and the CCC called a national conference 
in July of 2001 in La Matanza which boasted the name of “Capital of the Piquetero 
Movement”. The purpose was to prepare joint activities with a view to constituting a 
common front of mobilization of the unemployed. The participants at the meeting, carried 
out in the premises of the main church of the district, belonged to the kaleidoscopic and 
fragmented universe of the Argentine far left. Although they had little electoral weight 
and just a marginal presence in the organized labor movement, they had been able to 
gain a foothold among the unemployed by exploiting the cracks in Peronist clientelistic 
networks. But when the moment of decision regarding future strategies and objectives 
arrived, strong disagreements emerged among them.
One of the issues in dispute centered on the recourse to roadblocks. From the beginning, 
roadblocks had been the instruments par excellence to open a space of negotiation with 
authorities and obtain access to the distribution of unemployment subsidies and social 
help. Four years since the pioneering experiences in the oil enclaves, this modality 
of disruptive action was laid open to discussion. This first challenge –there would be 
others in the future- was dictated by political prudence: the practice of totally blocking 
off traffic on the roads provided the government with a good excuse for resorting to 
repression. Therefore, it was proposed, that from then on, roadblocks be partial; that 
is, that alternative lanes or routes be left open for vehicle circulation. The supporters 
of this tactical turnabout were the FTV and the CCC, the largest organizations due 
to the magnitude of their ranks both in the urban periphery and in the provinces. The 
dissident voices belonged to the representatives of relatively minor organizations 
located in the southern zone of the Greater Buenos Aires. For the MTD activists, the 
tactical turnabout amounted to a distortion of the meaning of their protest. As leaders of 
organizations that had developed in a more hostile context, they announced they were 
not willing to renounce a methodology of action tempered in the intense competition 
with the Peronist brokers.
A split emerged between those who advocated more moderate tactics and those 
committed to radical initiatives of direct action. This division was not only an expression 
of their contrasting positions in the political chessboard, it also revealed their opposed 
strategic visions. For the MTD activists, the piquetero movement had to deepen 
the struggle to cause the fall of the government, opening the way to a revolutionary 
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alternative, while the efforts of the FTV and CCC were aimed at an institutional solution 
through the creation of a wide political social front. In spite of their disagreements, 
the participants of the July national conference agreed to launch new mobilizations 
which ended up providing new occasions for their disagreements to become public. 
It did not come as a surprise that unity was not achieved in the second conference 
in September either. From then on, the piquetero movement unfolded between two 
poles, the one formed by the FTV and the CCC and the one called Bloque Piquetero 
Nacional composed of organizations associated to extreme left groupings – the main 
one of which was the Trotskyist Polo Obrero – and others with a more autonomous 
profile such as the factions of the MTD.
9.3 Third Wave
The third wave of protests took place against the backdrop of the social and economic 
crisis that exploded at the end of 2001 and caused President De la Rua’s resignation.
Measured against the expectations its electoral success had generated, De la Rua’s 
performance after its two years in office could not have been more unsatisfactory. 
Poverty and unemployment levels remained high; the promised economic recovery did 
not occur, and attempts to overcome the emergency translated into unpopular economic 
austerity measures. With these scarcely promising precedents, the government faced 
its first electoral test in the legislative elections of October 2001. Compared to the votes 
received two years earlier in 1999, the UCR-Frepaso coalition lost 4.94 million votes, or 
61 percent. The other face of the electoral result was the scale of political disaffection, 
mostly due to the loss of votes of the parties in power: More than 40% of the electorate 
either abstained from voting or cast void or blank votes. The Justicialista party also 
lost votes, but retained sufficient seats to control of both chambers of Congress. This 
ominous political stage marked the last days of De la Rua presidency (Torre 2005).
While the recession deepened and fears of a default on the foreign debt ran wild, the 
government intensified the fiscal adjustment measures, proposed renegotiating the 
payment of foreign debt and requested the IMF’s financial assistance. The fruits of 
these efforts were short lived. In view of the unmet fiscal objectives, at the beginning 
of December the IMF announced it would interrupt the supply of funds. Capital flight, 
already in progress since the beginning of the year, gained renewed momentum 
and produced a run on the banks. Deposits fell to such a degree that the economic 
authorities took a decision that would have grave consequences since it implied the de 
facto end of the currency board regime: in order to protect the banking system, they 
restricted cash withdrawals to a small sum. The impact of the sudden scarcity of pesos 
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in the street did not affect everyone to the same degree. Principally it affected the 
daily life of the popular sectors who funded their needs with the money that circulated 
through the networks of the informal economy. In addition, the abrupt halt of food 
assistance and unemployment subsidies deepened the climate of despair and anger 
growing in poverty enclaves.
In mid-December of 2001, a spiral of collective violence shocked the country. On the 
14th, groups of families in the popular neighborhoods of the city of Rosario, province 
of Santa Fe, started to throng round the entrances to supermarkets and, to the cry of 
“We are hungry“, demanded they be given food. When their demands went unheeded, 
they broke into the premises and, before bewildered managers and employees could 
react, took away all kinds of merchandise. During the next few days, a wave of looting 
broke out in the country’s main urban centers. By the end of the week, nearly 300 
supermarkets and grocery stores had been sacked, eighteen people killed, either by 
the police or by store owners, hundreds more injured, and thousands arrested.
Javier Auyero’s remarkable reconstruction of the December 19 and 20 lootings in the 
Greater Buenos Aires has thrown light on the backstage of those events and showed 
the role played by the Peronist political machine (Auyero 2007). When the demands for 
food broke out, the first protagonists were the unemployed organizations that mobilized 
in front of the big chain supermarkets which were under strong police protection. The 
negotiations between the piquetero leaders and the managers unfolded in a tense 
atmosphere but, in most cases, culminated without incident in the mass distribution of 
food. The fate of grocery stores and small supermarkets that were not lucky enough to 
receive police protection was very different. The absence of police or, more often, their 
passivity created “liberated zones” in the urban periphery: within them, the presence of 
Peronist brokers was visible, going through neighborhoods instigating their followers to 
rush the unprotected stores and take away all they could carry. There were storeowners 
who distributed food and avoided the looting; others, barricaded in their stores, fired 
at the multitude. During various days, television cameras bore witness to scenes of 
violence and fury in the greater Buenos Aires. For not a few observers –the piquetero 
leader Luis D’Elía was one of them – the intervention on the part of Peronist brokers and 
the police behavior were both factors of the onslaught orchestrated by the Justicialista 
party of the province of Buenos Aires with a view to shortening the days of De la Rua’s 
Presidency.
On December 19, protest broke out in the Federal Capital and new actors entered the 
stage. Sections of the middle class went out into the streets banging pots and pans 
to protest against the freezing of bank deposits or simply to express their indignation. 
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Their example inspired similar mobilizations in cities in the provinces. That night, a 
state of siege was decreed but the measure had no dissuasive effects. The next day, 
an irate multitude spontaneously occupied the Plaza de Mayo and merged with groups 
from Greater Buenos Aires. Police repression on the demonstrators killed fifteen more 
people. As the day was coming to a close, abandoned by his own party, De la Rua 
resigned.
The vacant presidency activated the constitutional norms that place the task of 
designating a new executive in the hands of Congress. Notwithstanding the legislative 
majorities, the Justicialista party leadership arrived at the time of decision immersed 
in internal conflicts. The first president lasted only a week in office. He was replaced 
by Eduardo Duhalde, the party strongman in the province of Buenos Aires, in order 
to complete ex-President De la Rua’s outstanding two years. Once in office, Duhalde 
devaluated the currency and put an end to the currency board economic regime.
The economic crisis of the end of 2001 reached its peak in 2002 amid the traumatic 
experience of abandoning the economic regime within which the country had functioned 
for the previous ten years. GNP contracted 11%, the unemployment rate increased from 
16.5 to 21.5%, purchasing power fell 30%, the proportion of people living under the 
poverty line climbed from 39% to 58% (Beccaria and Maurizio 2012). This disturbing 
social situation, together with the still fresh memory of collective violence and its tragic 
sequels, set off alarm bells in the new government. On January 28 2002, a large 
demonstration led by the FTV and the CCC reached the doors of the presidential palace 
demanding urgent solutions. The piquetero leaders brought with them a proposal: the 
creation of a basic citizen income. In the days before the events of December, the CTA, 
the organizer of a National Front against Poverty (FRENAPO in Spanish) had carried 
out an informal popular poll that collected some 3 million signatures in favor of the 
initiative. Two days after the large demonstration, Duhalde received Luis D’Elía and 
Juan Carlos Alderete and told them that he was about to launch a social program with 
premises similar to those of the Frenapo proposal. The bases of the future program 
had been discussed in a crisis committee – called the Diálogo Argentino – active the 
last days of De la Rua’s Presidency, with the participation of representatives of the 
church, trade unions, urban and rural employer associations, the UNDP and ONGs 
(Golbert 2006).
Framed as a “right to social inclusion”, the Head of Household Program (HHP) 
announced in April 2002 was aimed at providing a monthly income for unemployed 
male and female heads of households with children under eighteen. The monthly 
transfer – 150 pesos, 40 USD at the time – was not a temporary benefit; it would be 
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received until program beneficiaries found employment in the formal labor market. In 
turn, the heads of households had to fulfill certain conditionalities such as complying 
with school attendance and health controls for their children. The new program, which 
replaced the Trabajar Plan, was initially funded by state resources supplied for the 
most part by a tax on exporters who had profited from devaluation. A year later, a 
loan from the World Bank brought more funding and an additional conditionality: that 
program beneficiaries should participate in community development workfare projects. 
Aiming at reaching those in the direst straits, the working hours required were fewer 
than the previous workfare program: 20 per week instead of the 30-40 demanded by 
the Trabajar Plan (Golbert 2006; Andrenacci et al. 2006).
The HHP coverage expanded rapidly: by the end of 2002 its beneficiaries reached two 
million households. Later evaluations of the program have coincided in underscoring 
that not all beneficiaries satisfied the eligibility requirements, and that there were 
notorious deficiencies in the oversight of the fulfillment of conditionalities (Galasso and 
Ravaillon 2003). Still, and in hindsight, this program contributed to setting up a timely 
safety net in the peak of the crisis.
The institutional architecture of the new social policy included the creation of advisory 
committees tasked with supervising program applications and monitoring workfare 
activities. President Duhalde reserved a seat on those committees for representatives 
of the unemployed organizations in their capacity as NGOs. But only the FTV and 
the CCC accepted the offer; the remaining organizations strongly criticized their 
collaboration and kept a critical distance. In more general terms, the recognition of the 
leaders of the piquetero movement as authorized voices in the negotiation of the HHP 
entailed a striking innovation: for the first time in the country’s history, a social actor 
without an explicit linkage to the labor market was granted the capacity to discuss 
social policy.
With more responsibilities, the unemployed organizations became more 
professionalized over time. In addition to their mobilization activities they created 
technical and administrative units in charge of processing the routine operations of the 
social programs. The testimonies collected by anthropologist Virginia Manzano in La 
Matanza illustrated these developments (Manzano 2013). One of the interviewees, a 
CCC leader, recalled:
When we started with the 70 programs in 1997 we filled all the applications 
by hand. Now the whole system has been automated, so we had to get our 
first computer. We were forced to set up our own structure. Then came the 
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second computer, and the third... Today there are quite a few because a daily 
follow-up is required: if you don’t do it, the state always screws you and fails to 
deliver. That’s why we figured out that, apart from a central technical unit, each 
neighborhood had to have its own technical team. (Interview, CCC Leader, in 
Manzano 2013: 189).
Many were the tasks of the technical and administrative units: entering data into the 
IT systems, assigning beneficiaries to the different community projects, registering 
attendance at the organization’s activities, receiving monthly benefit transfers, reporting 
the program performance to the state authorities, following up on claims for rejected 
applications, and restoring benefits. This list of bureaucratic procedures speaks for 
itself of the range of skills and resources demanded by the co- administration of social 
welfare policies. A case in point: CCC militants interviewed by Manzano declared that 
they managed 36,000 HHP benefits at the national level (Manzano 2013: 188).
The massive growth of the new workfare program contributed to the expansion of the 
piquetero movement. However, a more careful look at the numbers shows that the 
PJ’s political machine reaped the lion’s share of the program’s benefits. According to 
some estimates, only 10% of HHP allowances were distributed by the unemployed 
organizations, while the remaining 90% were channeled through provincial governors 
and municipal mayors, for the most part enrolled in the governing party. With these 
initiatives, President Duhalde sought to neutralize the looming social conflict while 
simultaneously attending to a no less urgent imperative: re-building the ties with the 
popular base of Peronism in order to face a crisis of unprecedented magnitude with 
stronger political resources. The truce offered by FTV and CCC aided him in his 
endeavor. But he had to deal with the challenge from the other organizations which 
maintained a belligerent attitude. Their protest became a true political confrontation, 
under the barely concealed expectation that President Duhalde would eventually follow 
in the steps of former President De la Rua. On June 22nd, 2002, the Bloque Piquetero 
Nacional and the MTD groups announced that in the coming days they would block all 
access to the Federal Capital.
On June 26th, about 2,500 demonstrators marched on the Pueyrredón Bridge, the 
southern access to the city of Buenos Aires, with the intention of occupying it and 
blocking all vehicle circulation. On the bridge they ran up against police forces that tried 
to disperse the crowd with tear gas and rubber bullets. The demonstrators responded by 
throwing sticks and stones. The police reacted by launching a full-scale repression that 
ended up with the murder of two young militants. The images of the murders, registered 
by press photographers, triggered a massive wave of public indignation, which led 
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that very afternoon to more protest in the city main square, Plaza de Mayo. The next 
day Duhalde, who upon taking over the presidency had stated that the crisis would 
not be solved “with bullets or with bayonets”, condemned the police repression and 
ordered the arrest of those responsible. But his actions were not enough to neutralize 
the political crisis unleashed by the unexpected repetition of the tragic episodes of 
December 2001. Shortly after, he announced he would shorten his term in office and 
bring the presidential election forward to March 2003.
10. The New Political Scenario of Protest
From mid-2003 onwards, a fourth wave of protests took place within a context of 
changes in the political landscape and the economic situation. These changes modified 
the conditions that had hitherto shaped the trajectory of the piquetero movement: 
on one hand, the existence of a large mass of unemployed, and on the other, the 
marginal political position of the activists who led their mobilization. Regarding the 
latter condition, we have already indicated that the piquetero movement drew its 
leadership from the left wing of the political chessboard. As a result, and despite 
ideological disputes and tactical disagreements, the leaders shared a common stance: 
to oppose any government in office. The rapprochement of the FTV and CCC to the 
Duhalde administration within the framework of the HHP broke that common stance 
but only in part: their organization remained mobilized. As the leader of the Justicialista 
party in the Province of Buenos Aires, Duhalde was the embodiment of the clientelistic 
networks against which they had struggled in the Greater Buenos Aires. Consequently, 
the leaders of both organizations kept a critical distance from the Duhalde government 
and did not give up the resort to protest. However, the 2003 national elections would 
alter the political landscape in which the piquetero movement had grown (Novaro, 
Bonvecchi and Cherny 2014).
Still torn by internal divisions, the Peronists presented three candidates in the national 
election, which took place in two rounds. In the first round, the candidates that gathered 
more votes were Carlos Menem (24.4%), and Nestor Kirchner (22%). The second 
round, however, did not take place because Menem withdrew in order to avoid being 
beaten, as the polls predicted he would. Under such circumstances, and with a slim 
margin of legitimacy, Kirchner became President. He was the former governor of a 
remote southern province, and took over the presidency with a strong discourse: he 
rejected neoliberal reforms in the name of a return to a national form of capitalism, he 
exalted the memory of the desaparecidos under the military dictatorship as he called for 
deepening the cause of human rights, and used his relatively peripheral position in the 
Peronist galaxy to present himself as a new man, without ties to the traditional political 
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class and the corporate powers. His speech and his energetic gestures generated 
great expectations among large sectors of public opinion, and provoked a realignment 
in the ranks of the piquetero movement.
The new countenance of Peronism in power provoked opposite reactions among 
the cadres of militants in the organizations of the unemployed. For those who came 
from left-wing populism, it represented an opening and a unique political opportunity: 
the levers of the state were in the hands of a leadership in sync with the national-
populist tradition of Peronism. They rapidly surrounded a president in need of political 
support, in exchange for resources for their own organizations. Like Duhalde before 
him, Kirchner, no sooner he was installed in power, met with the leaders of the FTV 
and CCC, and made them an offer of dialogue. When the time came to reward their 
willingness to cooperate, however, the benefits were distributed unequally. Luis D’Elía, 
who had participated in Kirchner’s presidential campaign, took the lion’s share. Juan 
Carlos Alderete was sidelined, and a year later he led the Maoist militants from the 
CCC into the ranks of the opposition to the government. The impact of the new political 
landscape was the divergent paths taken by the two organizations that had hitherto led 
the mobilization of the unemployed.
The gamut of pro-Peronist organizations included, in addition to FTV, others that were 
more recent, among them Barrios de Pie and Movimiento Evita. In order to satisfy 
their demands, the government established an informal cabinet composed of many 
who had shared a long history of militancy within the Peronist left in alliance with the 
piqueteros activists (Boyanosky Bazan 2010). Because of this privileged acquaintance 
these groups received the largest share of benefits from the new social plans, such 
as subsidies for the construction of homes and for investments in small businesses. 
Together with the flow of funds, Kirchner offered them jobs in the public administration, 
in particular in those sectors that managed social and community activities. The most 
salient appointment was that of Luis D’Elía, for whom the government invented a new 
agency inside the Ministry of Social Action, as Undersecretary for Land and Housing.
Predictably, the integration into government structures induced tactical changes in the 
pro-Peronist ranks. Access to power sites made direct inside pressure more effective 
than the resort to public protest. In order to obtain benefits, they opted for closed-
door negotiations over collective mobilization. But this tactical shift was not the only 
visible effect of their new political status. More generally, the very political design of 
these organizations changed. Though originally designed to serve the cause of the 
unemployed, their insertion in the government turned them into players in the wider 
political game, as peons in the strategy of the new president to develop support for his 
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policies outside the orbit of the Justicialista Party, where his ascending leadership met 
strong resistance. On a political stage where Kirchner played the role of conductor and 
strategist in chief, the pro-Peronist activists could hardly avoid becoming dependents 
that, in exchange for the benefits they obtained for their own organizations, were now 
subordinate to political and tactical moves beyond their control.
The ideological versatility of Peronism, which promoted neoliberalism under Menem, 
and then became critical of neoliberalism under Kirchner, made no impression on 
the other wing of the piqueteros’ movement: the organizations under the umbrella 
of the Bloque Piquetero Nacional, and the new left wing currents of the MTD. All 
of them, from those more attached to a party to those that sought to preserve their 
autonomy, coincided on the same diagnosis: the new government represented the 
continuity of previous administrations. Or, to put it in their own words, it was just 
another astute version of the strategy of the dominant class. Thus, they remained in 
opposition. This decision had two consequences. First, their decision placed these 
organizations against the mood of public opinion, the majority of which yearned for 
a return to institutional normality after the recent traumatic episodes. Second, it led 
them to confront a president who, a few months after his inauguration, was gathering 
high levels of approval as the guarantor of a new beginning for a shaken nation. Both 
consequences paved the way to the political isolation of these non-Peronist factions 
of the piquetero movement. The political dynamic that ensued is well known: from 
political isolation stems radicalization, in a mutually reinforcing spiral (Della Porta and 
Diani 2011). The more isolated a movement becomes, the lower will be its expectation 
of immediate gains and the greater its ideological radicalization and its belligerence in 
political action. This dynamic soon became clear when these organizations resorted to 
the same disruptive tactics that they had used before 2003. The price they would pay 
for their dissonance with the general consensus was a dire one: the gradual erosion in 
the legitimacy of social protest.
11. The Economic Recovery and the Fall in Unemployment
The new scenario of Argentine development after 2003 not only undermined the 
unified action of the piquetero movement; it also affected its social base as the 
improvement of the economy made unemployment drop. We have already mentioned 
the negative impact that the rupture of the monetary straitjacket of the currency board 
had on economic output, employment, and salaries, and the subsequent increase in 
poverty. But now, after a few months, still under the clouds of crisis, the economic 
engine managed to restart, to the almost unanimous surprise of both analysts and the 
government itself (Levi Yeyati and Valenzuela 2007). The deepest depression in the 
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contemporary history of the country proved to be quite short: in the last quarter of 2002 
the first signs of economic reactivation appeared. Some public policy decisions, in 
conjunction with new external economic factors, put an end to four years of recession.
The initial push came from exports. The agrarian sector, which had been modernized 
during the previous decade, reacted positively to the monetary devaluation by the 
Duhalde government by increasing production and diversifying supply. The same 
was true of export industries – auto, steel, and paper – which recovered their lost 
markets. By mid-2003, economic recovery had spread beyond the export complex. The 
industries oriented toward the internal market took advantage of the protective barrier 
of a higher rate of exchange and rapidly promoted an active import re-substitution. In 
turn, construction made its own contribution. Under such circumstances, a new virtuous 
circle radiated over the entire economy: as production increased so did employment, 
the fall in unemployment made salaries rise, and all of these factors made production 
increase further. The government also contributed to this recovery through the fiscal 
surplus it generated, based on two pillars, namely, higher tax revenues from exports, 
and the drastic reduction in external payments on a reduced debt as a result of the 
2001 default.
With more resources at its disposal, the government increased social spending and 
investments in infrastructure. During 2003, the economy grew at an annual rate of 
8.8% in a context of low inflation. It was then that the country received a powerful boost 
from international markets. Thanks to the great demand from China and vigorous world 
growth, the prices for agricultural goods exported by Argentina reached levels never 
before attained. By 2005, the dark forecasts for the economy were eclipsed by a new 
wave of growth that would last until the end of the decade.
With the economic recovery,  the proportion of the population with employment problems 
diminished steadily. The rate of unemployment of 25.5% registered in 2002, the peak 
of the crisis, fell to 20% in 2003, 13.1% in 2005, and 8.5% in 2007 (Beccaria and 
Maurizio 2012). Changes in the labor market and their consequences – the creation of 
employment and the parallel strengthening employed workers’ power to exert economic 
pressure – modified the nature of social conflict. After two years in which more than 
50% of the conflicts were promoted by the organizations of the unemployed, from 2005 
on, over 75% of the conflicts were led by the trade unions (Etchmendy and Collier 
2007). The shift in the axis of protest from employment problems to the distributive 
conflicts translated into the return of trade unions to their central position in the world 
of work, one hand and, into a gradual retreat of the piquetero movement, on the other.
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 The effects of the post-crisis period meant a serious setback for the survival of the 
organizations of the unemployed. Starting in 2003, the number of beneficiaries of the 
Heads of Households Programs diminished: from two million in 2003 to 1.5 million in 
2005 and 750,000 in 2007 (Repetto and Diaz Langou 2010). Even though many of 
the former beneficiaries migrated to other social welfare programs created in 2005, 
the majority took advantage of new job openings to return to the labor market. The 
subsequent loss of power and resources of the organizations of the unemployed 
highlighted an issue that had always haunted them; namely, how could they secure 
the support of the unemployed on a sustained and permanent basis?
12. The Relationship between the Piquetero Movement and its   
 Social Base
In order to explore the nature of the aforementioned problem, we could begin by referring 
to the ideal portrait of the unemployed organization drawn by M. Svampa (2005). 
Beyond their ideological slant and differences in size, these organizations are networks 
of association with varying degrees of participation and political engagement. They all 
have a center occupied by the leadership and a first ring composed of intermediate 
cadres that perform as delegates of the organization in the neighborhoods. They all 
share the strategic vision of the movement. There follows a second tier of sympathizers 
with less political involvement; finally, there is a vast periphery of people that approach 
the organization propelled by their urgent needs for the most elementary goods and 
services. The great challenge for the leaders and the hard core of the organization – 
the very heart of the piquetero identity – has always been how to anchor the ties to this 
vast periphery more on a political commitment than on sheer material necessity.
When we shift our perspective to that of the population at risk in terms of employment, 
as revealed in the excellent ethnographic study by Julieta Quirós (2011), we understand 
the magnitude of the challenge faced by the piquetero activists. Usually, the unemployed 
put their names on the waiting list of a given organization in order to qualify for the 
benefits of a workfare program. If they do not comply with the conditions attached to 
such benefits (foremost their participation in mobilizations) or if they do not receive the 
expected benefits reasonably soon, they try their luck in other organizations offering 
the same services in their neighborhood. This shopping around moved across political 
boundaries. In the microcosm of the unemployed, there was no neat distinction between 
the piqueteros and the local Peronist political brokers. Members of the same family 
shared the benefits and contacts of different organizations, regardless of disputes 
among their leaders. More specifically, Quiros found that many of the unemployed did 
not see themselves as “piqueteros” but as “being with the piqueteros” (Quiros 2011: 
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323). This expression reveals the transitory nature of their affiliation, in opposition to 
the permanent commitment of more politicized minorities, who lived by and for the 
movement.
Indeed, those ties could be transitory but they were also socially intense. As Quiros 
has stressed, “being with the piqueteros” meant more than the simple expectation of 
receiving a subsidy. At the same time, “being with the piqueteros” offered the chance 
of overcoming fatalism and vulnerability: it meant doing something to change one’s 
predicament and showing that being unemployed was not equivalent to being socially 
dead. But this subjectively rewarding experience did not generally imply a commitment 
of the unemployed to the political cause of the piquetero organizations. According 
to Quiros, the stronger ties were formed with the neighborhood delegates of those 
organizations, because they were directly involved in meeting the people’s needs. Such 
personal commitment was very often revealed when one of those delegates broke with 
their organization, and took with them a sizeable number of the unemployed.
The political achievements of the far left activists at the helm of the unemployed 
organizations always came up shorter than their ambitions. In the view of the activists, 
the mobilization of the unemployed was just a platform from which to gain influence 
on the national political stage. However, when they tried to transfer the support they 
had obtained in the struggle for benefits for the unemployed to the service of their 
political causes, the results were almost insignificant as the 2003 elections showed. 
Just before the elections that carried Kirchner to the Presidency, the CCCs launched 
a call to abstain, but when the votes were counted, it became evident that the level of 
electoral participation had increased compared to the previous election. In turn, the 
harvest of the small parties of the left who had opted for participation was very low 
also. The percentage of votes obtained by the legislative candidates of the Frente de 
Izquierda Unida and the Partido Obrero in the district of the province of Buenos Aires 
was 2.45% and 0.84%, respectively. It should be noted that the meager 22% that 
supported Kirchner came principally from the popular sectors of the Great Buenos 
Aires, the traditional constituency of the Peronist party. What emerges from this short 
digression on the links between the piquetero movement and its bases is evident: 
thanks to a persevering militancy in the territory, leftist activists were able to mobilize 
a great number of jobless people around their more pressing demands; however, they 
faced serious obstacles when the time came to translate the social backing they had 
garnered into solid political commitment to their cause.
13. Policing the Protest
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Towards the end of Kirchner’s first year in the presidency, the situation of the piquetero 
movement was characterized by two contrasting developments: on the one hand, the 
demobilization of the pro-Peronist organizations, and on the other, the intensification 
of the protest by extreme left organizations. In this fourth and last wave of protest 
encompassing the period from 2003 to 2007, the blocking of highways lost the 
importance it had held in the past. The frequent resort to this instrument of protest had 
contributed to a negative image of the mobilization of the unemployed. That is why they 
started resorting to street protests instead. Periodically, columns of the unemployed 
from the urban periphery entered the city and marched in downtown areas converging 
on public offices or the Plaza de Mayo. Their goal was to denounce the loss of subsidies 
and demand their restitution. The bureaucratic controls on the distribution of benefits, 
which were often prey to misuse and petty corruption, targeted those organizations 
that were not aligned with the government. There were also demonstrations that had a 
more clearly political objective. Such was the case of those staged on the anniversary 
of the Pueyrredón Bridge assassinations or against the judicial indictment of militants.
The policing of protests by the government had two phases according to the research 
carried out by Federico Fuchs (Fuchs 2006). During the first, a permissive policy 
prevailed, whereas in the second, stronger measures were adopted but they fell short 
of direct repression. Once installed in the presidency, Kirchner made it clear that there 
would be no repression of social protests. His decision acknowledged the criticisms 
on the part of human rights organizations of the management of social conflict, and 
was part of his efforts to enlist support for a government that had begun with scant 
electoral backing. The policy of no repression was, in addition, in tune with the spirit of 
conciliation that prevailed among wide portions of public opinion. But there was also 
another reason: the lack of confidence in the ability of law enforcement personnel to 
handle disruptive actions. The use of direct force to defuse situations of acute conflict 
risked an escalation of violence, as had occurred in the episodes of December 2001 
and June 2002. Thus, during the first phase, official policy was that the police abstain 
from intervening in street marches. They were deployed inconspicuously during 
demonstrations, avoided direct contact with the demonstrators, and acted only to 
prevent incidents.
This permissive policy towards unemployed mobilizations elicited strong objections from 
business organizations, opposition parties, and the traditional press. At the Peronist 
headquarters in the Province of Buenos Aires, Eduardo Duhalde also questioned the 
government’s softline approach towards social protest. Even some district mayors 
of Greater Buenos Aires, while supporting the government, strongly objected to the 
presence of piqueteros on the streets. The Church also joined in the chorus of critics by 
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warning that the government’s passivity could lead to social chaos. President Kirchner 
responded with harsh words and accused all of them of seeking a return to the political 
violence of the past. With an eye to the polls that registered a high degree of approval 
for his government, he ratified his commitment not to repress social protest.
In the provinces, on the other hand, local police forces did not always go along 
with central government policies. Under orders from the respective governors, they 
repeatedly repressed actions that blocked highways causing several deaths. The 
federal government kept to its position, even when the repertoire of protests would 
have justified more extreme measures. That was the case of the one-day occupation 
of the Ministry of Labor – the agency that was in charge of workfare programs – in 
October 2003. Kirchner sternly criticized the occupation but did not authorize police 
intervention and left the resolution of the conflict in the hands of the Ministry personnel. 
Thus, a dual strategy that would become the hallmark of the immediate future started 
to take shape: on the one hand, a rejection of protest as a form of extortion, and on the 
other a refusal to use force against it. Four months later there was a new occupation of 
the Ministry of Labor, this time with another measure: during six days, the piqueteros 
improvised an encampment in the street facing the ministry, asking to be heard. The 
practice of camping out, installing both tents and soup kitchens, already in use in the 
provinces, now reached the city of Buenos Aires broadening the repertoire of protest 
at a very visible site, the Plaza de Mayo.
During this fourth phase of the protest, a cleavage began to emerge between opposing 
factions within the piquetero movement. The larger organizations, the CCC and the 
BPN, started to moderate their disruptive mobilizations. When they blocked highways, 
they did it outside rush hour and without a total blockage of the traffic flow. They also 
distanced themselves from more extreme measures, like the ones aforementioned, 
acknowledging their negative impact on public opinion. But the groups who still 
promoted these tactics did not suffer from such scruples. These were mostly smaller 
splinter organizations that had formed during the 2003 crises of piquetero organizations. 
The government’s refusal to use force played a role in this process of fragmentation. 
The tactical differences and ideological squabbles typical of the extreme left found 
expression in different organizations, partly as a consequence of police passivity. The 
opportunity to engage in cost-free demonstrations led the dissidents inside the protest 
organizations to break with them, multiplying the sites of conflict.
This was the context of the second phase of government policy towards protests. 
The occasion arrived in July 2004 when the legislature of the city of Buenos Aires 
was considering adopting a set of ordinances regarding access to public spaces. 
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The new code of access forbade street prostitution, as well as street vendors, and 
especially street demonstrations without prior official permission. In repudiation of 
such measures, the piquetero organizations staged a march on the city legislature. 
At the end of the demonstration a small group of activists broke away and provoked 
serious incidents by stoning the legislature building, and damaging its main doors. 
Faced with this turn of events, the protest organizers decided to leave the site and, 
in later statements, condemned the infiltration of  “unidentified elements” and their 
attempts to sabotage the popular mobilization. The government’s first reaction was a 
tactical retreat. For several hours the violence increased with no police intervention. 
Finally, the police forces were given the order to advance. Not without difficulty, and 
with the use of tear gas, they restored order in the streets and made numerous arrests. 
The confrontation was televised and had a significant public impact. The dramatic 
TV images lent credence to the government’s narrative that placed the blame for the 
serious disturbances on a small group of some “fifty extreme-left provocateurs”.
After these episodes the government started to revise its strategy and replaced its 
previous permissive attitude with a policy directed at limiting the number of disruptive 
actions. Public buildings were protected with barriers so that they could not be 
occupied. There were no restrictions to the practice of setting up camps, but on the few 
occasions in which protestors attempted to do so in front of Government House, they 
were met by a tight cordon of police. There was no more tolerance for the complete 
blockage of highways or other means of access to the city of Buenos Aires. Street 
marches continued to take place but with a more visible presence of police. The new 
official tactic consisted in a strong show of force, saturating public spaces with police 
forces equipped with anti-riot gear (helmets, sticks, and shields, but no firearms) as 
dissuasive devices.
In any event, police control was selective. The piquetero organizations that adapted 
to the new situation could act without much risk. In some instances they engaged 
in negotiations with the government, which led to the curtailment or suspension of 
mobilizations. When an organization close to the government, such as the one led by 
Luis D’Elía, engaged in extreme measures against a rival faction, it was not repressed. 
However, the small groups of activists that defied the police were severely punished, 
and many were prosecuted and harshly sentenced by the justice system.
The end of the permissive policy, clearly visible in 2005, closely followed the shifts in 
public opinion regarding the piquetero mobilizations. In order to place this sequence 
in context, it is useful to remember what has been said about protest as a principal 
resource for social groups at the margins of the political system for negotiating with 
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public authorities. As stated by Michael Lipsky in his classic study, the efficacy of this 
method of pressure depends on the capacity of those who use it to draw support 
from other more mainstream groups that are well-situated to influence decision makers 
(Lipsky 1965,1968). The resort to protest thus sets in motion a process of indirect 
persuasion. Those who protest aspire to obtain sympathy from “third parties” which, 
though distant from the causes of conflict, are politically significant for the powers that 
be. If the plan succeeds, these “third parties” will most likely intervene demanding 
that the authorities pay attention and offer solutions to the demands of those who 
protest. As such, the process of indirect persuasion faces the protest leaders with a 
dilemma: they must calibrate their action in such a way as to avoid alienating third-
party support and turning it into an unfavorable disposition or a hostile reaction. If the 
latter is the outcome, the action and demands of these influential actors will shift from 
a plea to the authorities to correct an unjust situation to demanding they put an end to 
the disturbances generated by the protests.
The political dynamics sketched above describe well the avatars of the fourth wave of 
protests. As shown by Federico Fuchs (2006), the choices made by the government 
were strongly conditioned by the pressure of public opinion. In general terms, this 
should not be surprising since it is to be expected in a competitive political system. But 
in this particular case, President Kirchner’s sensitivity to the popular mood had a more 
immediate and personal source: it was all of his political capital. Elected with a low 
percentage of the vote, the main source of support for his government stemmed from 
maintaining the high indexes of approval he had obtained in his first months in power. 
Those high levels owed a great deal to the perceptions of the metropolitan middle 
class which was precisely the sector whose daily routines were most affected by the 
marches on the streets.
As I have already remarked, initially public opinion reacted favorably to the mobilization 
of the unemployed. According to the opinion polls examined by Fuchs, until mid-2004 
the government’s permissive attitude was largely approved. The episodes that took 
place at the city’s legislature in July of that year changed this trend. A poll taken after 
those events shows that nearly two-thirds of people interviewed disagreed with a policy 
of no repression and half of them blamed the government for the incidents. The impact 
of those incidents endangered a politically sensitive area: the positive image of the 
government, when a university institute reported a fall in the level of confidence. These 
were the circumstances that led to a turnabout in the tactics for policing protests.
14. The Decline of the Piquetero Movement
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Besides their contribution to the end of a permissive policy, the shifts in public opinion 
had other two consequences. The first concerns the status of protest. As remarked 
above, the resort to protest by the piquetero movement provoked a debate about the 
right to protest versus the right to circulate freely. Towards the end of 2004, the second 
position prevailed leading to the growing litigation of protest. The second consequence 
was the delegitimation of the piquetero movement as such. The frequency with which 
the marches interrupted the city’s daily life ignited a sense of irritation and anger among 
the middle classes of the city and Greater Buenos Aires. As was to be expected under 
such circumstances, these sectors tended to regard the piquetero movement - whether 
for or against the government - less as an expression of suffering by the victims of the 
social crisis than as the work of agitators.
This change in public opinion coincided with a sustained expansion of the economy and 
a rapid increase in job creation. With the return to the practice of collective bargaining, 
labor conflicts multiplied and came to the fore. It should be noted that the resurgence 
of labor pressure took place in a context of a rate of unemployment that was still high 
(13% in 2005). As would become clear in the following years, the segmentation of the 
labor market produced by the neoliberal reforms altered the terms of the distributive 
struggle. Most of the informal sector and the unemployed could not compete with the 
more privileged workers that were occupied in the formal sector of the economy. Under 
these circumstances, even though they covered only 40% of the labor force, the unions 
woke from their long lethargy and started to reassume the leadership of social protest.
Despite a more hostile political setting, the piquetero movement also intensified its 
mobilization in 2005, raising the banner of those that were being left behind in a 
growing economy or had difficulties in joining it. Their mobilization not only took place 
in a public space that was more controlled by the police. It also had to face President 
Kirchner who had been strengthened in his quest to take command of the governing 
party (Novaro, Bonvecchi and Cherny 2014). This dispute took place mainly in the 
Province of Buenos Aires, and against his principal rival, former President Duhalde. 
With abundant fiscal resources at his disposal, Kirchner managed to co-opt key local 
bosses of the Greater Buenos Aires political machine. With their support, he presented 
his own list of candidates in the legislative elections of October 2005 and roundly 
defeated the Peronist candidates linked to Duhalde. Empowered by an electoral 
victory that also had backing from other provinces, Kirchner emerged from the election 
as the unquestioned leader of the Peronist movement, heading a larger and stronger 
government coalition that brought together both the party machine bosses and the 
branches of the unemployed organizations.
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With greater political support and the backing of a public opinion that had become less 
tolerant of street demonstrations, the government reacted with a strategy of wearing 
down the piqueteros’ offensive: it allowed the mobilizations but firmly rejected their 
demands. Under such circumstances, the resort to protest ceased to work as an 
instrument to open up channels of influence and negotiation with the authorities. This 
resulted in a feeling of impotence among the piquetero leaders. The words of Juan 
Carlos Alderete – the leader of the most important organization of the unemployed 
– illustrated this predicament well: “If the government calls us to negotiate, we will 
suspend our measures” (Fornillo 2008: 243). But the authorities remained firm in their 
policy of refusing negotiations. At the beginning of 2006, the CCC mobilizations showed 
a marked decrease in their ranks and a year later their marches grew more sporadic 
and confined to the neighborhoods in the urban periphery (Fornillo 2008).
The more drastic official attitude towards unemployed demonstrations combined with 
a significant fall in unemployment weakened the piquetero movement. This decline 
was also intensified in turn by the shrinking of its social base. As mentioned above, 
large numbers of the unemployed left the movement and started looking for jobs. The 
jobs they found were precarious, especially in the building trades, since that was the 
growing sector in terms of employment. Nevertheless, the “odd jobs” – occasional, 
informal occupations – were more attractive than the workfare programs, because 
the allowances were not indexed, despite rising inflation. Another cause of desertion 
from the movement was the pressure from local Peronist political brokers, and from 
pro-government unemployed organizations, backed by more resources and more 
political protection. Some organizations, however, managed to keep their positions 
in neighborhoods and their subsidies flowing despite the adverse context, but they 
tended to retreat to the Greater Buenos Aires area where they created some pockets of 
subsistence economy. By 2007, the cycle of the unemployed mobilization in Argentina 
had come to an end.
15. Epilogue
For almost ten years, the unemployed movement mobilized against the negative 
consequences of the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s and the subsequent impact of 
the 2002 crisis triggered by the collapse of the currency board. At the time of their 
decline as socio-political actors, the original sources of their collective protest had 
already began to weaken: the high unemployment rates, the growth of informal labor, 
the increase of poverty, the levels of inequality previously unknown to one of the least 
unequal countries in Latin America.
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As emerges from the literature discussed in a recent book by Gabriel Kessler, the 
positive evolution of social indicators was prompted by a favorable economic situation 
and the effects of income policies (Kessler 2014). The economic recovery initiated by 
the end of 2002 continued until 2010 at an annual rate of 8% of GDP (except during 
2009 due to the impact of the global crisis) and resulted, as previously indicated, in 
a steep fall in unemployment rates, which eventually settled around 8% in 2010. The 
speedy increase in labor demand contributed to the recovery of wages after the losses 
experienced during 2002. This recovery was also facilitated by government policy. At its 
outset, when unemployment was still high and labor unions correspondingly weak, the 
government granted wage increases for the whole of the workforce through emergency 
decrees. Another official initiative was the series of minimum wage hikes established 
by law, to compensate for the loss of their real value. As the labor market improved, the 
authorities promoted the return to collective bargaining; business-labor agreements 
thus proliferated after years of scarce and sporadic settlements. The revitalization 
of this institution channeled the increasing bargaining power of workers towards the 
defense of real wages. The effects of income policies were actually stronger in the 
formal economy, though they also served as a reference point for wage settlements 
among the segments not covered by social security and the self-employed. The plight 
of the workforce in the informal economy also gained prominence in the public agenda. 
The labor authorities launched a vast campaign aimed against informal labor and at 
reducing the number of workers forced to endure in precarious jobs with no stability or 
social benefits. The payoff from these efforts and the post-crisis economic growth was 
the reduction of the share of informal labor from 55% in 2003 to 45% in 2010.
The succession of Nestor Kirchner by his wife, Cristina Fernandez, in the 2007 
presidential election secured the continuity of this re-regulation of labor institutions. 
The new administration expanded the reach of social assistance directed at the most 
vulnerable sectors of the population: the conditional cash transfer policy, of which the 
dwindling Head of Household Program was the most relevant example. In late 2009, a 
new program was introduced by decree, the Universal Child Allowance (AUH), which 
consisted of a monthly transfer for each child under 18 years of age to the households 
whose heads were either informal or unemployed workers. The reception of this benefit 
was conditional on the commitment by the parents to certify before the authorities that 
their children were attending school and receiving regular health checkups. Financed 
with budgetary transfers, the new program increased protection for the most needy, 
given the strong association between informality, unemployment, and poverty. Of  the 
3.4 million of children covered during the first year of implementation of the AUH, 80% 
came from the poorest 40% of the population (Gasparini and Cruces 2010). By virtue of its 
design, this program vastly superseded the Head of Households program: its coverage 
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is higher, the access to its benefits does not lend itself to discretionary practices, its 
amounts are periodically updated, and its magnitude has a strong incidence on family 
income. Additionally, with an eye on informal labor, the government implemented an 
initiative with strong distributional effect: the granting of pensions to people who had 
reached the age of retirement but, due to their status in the labor market, had not been 
able to make the required contributions to the social security system.
The situation that emerged from 2003, marked by the pace of the aforementioned 
economic and institutional changes, altered the extant patterns of inequality and 
poverty. In their initial phase, the 2003-2007 period, the increases in employment 
and real wages were accompanied by a substantial improvement in the inequality 
index: the Gini coefficient dropped from 0.53 to 0.47. Subsequently, the rise of inflation 
and its effects on purchasing power stymied this fall, eventually reaching a Gini 
coefficient in 0.44 by 2010. That this tendency towards the fall of inequality continued 
notwithstanding inflation and its effects owed a great deal to the increase in social 
spending due to the implementation of the AUH and the expansion of non- contributive 
pensions. As others have underscored (Perez Sainz 2013), the mere drop in the Gini 
coefficient is not enough to describe an increase in equality, because this index is 
focused on the secondary distribution of income, the one that takes place after capital 
and labor have divided the pie. Therefore, the data need to be examined from the 
complementary viewpoint of the primary – or functional – distribution of income. When 
observed through this lens, the 2003-2010 period also shows a fall in inequality. The 
share of wages in national income, which by 2003 had fallen to 34.3% in the aftermath 
of the previous crisis, rose to 41.4% by 2010.
To complete this brief account of the changes in social indicators, let us draw attention 
to the evolution of poverty. This dimension of the social landscape depicts the light and 
shadows of all efforts made to revert social welfare losses. At first sight, the tendency 
here also appears to be positive: the share of the population below the poverty line fell 
from 58% in 2002 to around 25% in 2010. The biggest chunk of this fall in the incidence 
of poverty took place between 2003 and 2007; later on, the process stopped as inflation 
rose and growth rates slowed down. It is indisputable that the situation in the labor 
market improved in the context of the social and economic turn after 2003, but it is 
also true that the levels of social deprivation remained high insofar as almost one third 
of the population is currently poor. This points to the limits of the policy instruments 
used to provide social assistance to the needy. These instruments have typically been 
conditional cash transfers. As such, they are effective at reducing the poverty gap in 
the short term by attending to the most urgent material necessities. But they do not 
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improve the personal capacities of the poor or their ability to autonomously generate 
income in the medium term (Lavinas 2014).
In hindsight, the achievements in the reduction of inequality and poverty, threatened 
as ever by the more recent oscillations of Argentine economic performance, have not 
sufficed to overcome the most enduring consequence of neoliberal reforms and their 
aftermath: the emergence of entire populations with weak i ties or no tie at all to the 
world of labor, who survive on precarious jobs and the help of social assistance, such 
as the inhabitants of Greater Buenos Aires shantytowns. In comparative terms, the 
existence of these populations has placed marginality in the spotlight, not because their 
level of destitution is higher than that in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas but rather because 
they have grown in a country that historically developed under the promise of a more 
equal access to resources and rights for all its citizens; indeed, the same promise that 
inspired and set in motion the mobilization of the unemployed.
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16. Appendix 1: Number of Protests with Participation by    
 Picketers’ Organizations 1992-2007
N=772
Total protests registered for the period: 7759
Source: Dataset, Grupo de Estudios sobre Protesta Social y Acción Colectiva (2014), Instituto Gino 
Germani, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Buenos Aires. 
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